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Insurance and banking services represent the core financial services. Financial services 
belong to European Union’s top areas of interest since their providers are often active 
in multiple Member States and they have the potential to influence the interconnected 
EU economy. Consumer protection in the EU is generally formed of certain measures 
and areas of regulation which are believed to empower consumers who are contracting 
with entrepreneurs. Consumer protection in insurance and banking businesses are 
structured very similarly because they both belong to financial services working on 
similar principles. 
 
According to the World Bank1 there are the following areas of measures that secure 
protection of consumers in the financial services business – consumer protection 
institutions, disclosure and sales practices, customer account handling and 
maintenance (management), privacy and data protection, dispute resolution 
mechanisms, guarantee and compensation schemes, financial literacy and consumer 
empowerment, competition among the credit providers. In this thesis, we focus on the 
pre-contractual and contractual relationship between the consumer and the financial 
services institution and between the consumer and the intermediary. These are mainly 
disclosure and sales practices, customer account management and dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Beside the areas listed by the World Bank, the author identifies other 
typical measures occurring in consumer protection legislation – transparency and 
information disclosure, forbidden clauses in contracts, rules of conduct and internal 
policies for entrepreneurs, out-of-court redress and promotion of financial literacy 
among consumers. In the thesis we closely examine the extent of application of these 
measures in banking and insurance law in the EU. 
 
                                                          







Pre-contractual and contractual protection of consumers is subject mainly to three 
directives – Insurance Distribution Directive2 for insurance law and Consumer Credit 
Directive3 and Mortgage Credit Directive4 for banking law. Insurance Distribution 
Directive shall be transposed into national laws in 2018 so this topic is current and 
relevant as of the time of writing this thesis. In the first part of this work we analyse 
and assess insurance law, mainly empowerment of consumers by provisions of 
Insurance Distribution Directive, but we also compare Insurance Distribution 
Directive with previous legislation which is still in force by the time of closing this 
work. In the second part we analyse and assess banking law and compare Consumer 
Credit Directive and Mortgage Credit Directive and their contribution to consumer 
protection. In the third part, we compare all three directives in general as well as in 
selected topics. Finally, we evaluate the approach to consumer protection, consumers 
and balance between efficient economy and protected consumers. 
 
This work reflects legislation as of 28 May 2018. 
  
                                                          
2 Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 January 2016 on 
insurance distribution (recast). 
3 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC. 
4 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 
2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 
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1. Insurance law 
1.1 Introduction 
If we look at the regulation from consumers‘ point of view the most direct way how to 
protect customer (before, during and shortly after entering into a contract) is thru the 
distribution requirements. The less direct way which can be still very efficient is to 
impose obligations on distributors regarding their qualities and handling manners 
when selling the insurance product. The insurance product and services themselves are 
highly important, therefore they are subject to regulation as well. All these topics are 
subject to Directive (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 January 2016 on insurance distribution (recast) (hereinafter Insurance Distribution 
Directive or IDD), whereas a very specific rules regarding Key Information Document 
for insurance-based investment products is contained in the Regulation (EU) No 
1286/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
key information documents for packaged retail and insurance-based investment 
products (PRIIPs). 
 
From the direct ways we come to rather indirect ways such as demands on qualities of 
the insurance undertakings, e.g. internal governance, risk management. The most 
significant and influential regulation is the Directive 2009/138/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of 
the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (hereinafter Solvency II).  
 
There is a huge number of laws which can affect insurance business with bigger or 
smaller impact. Association of British Insurers (hereinafter also ABI) has conducted 
an extensive and in-depth analysis of EU law which is applicable to insurance 
undertakings in the UK. According to the analysis, there are 80 pieces of legislation 
which are effective or will come into force before 20195. However, the work of ABI 
did include many laws which are not directly linked to insurance business itself but 
                                                          
5 ASSOCIATION OF BRITISH INSURER'S. In: EU Legislation Mapping Exercise: EU Exit [online]. 






affect large amount of industries, such as legislation on data protection6 or accounting 
and taxation. In this work we will discuss more closely law which is designed 
particularly for insurance. 
 
1.1.1 Historical development 
Distribution is an essential part of consumer protection regardless the business area 
concerned, so the first attempts to ensure level playing field in insurance distribution 
has emerged already in the 1970s in the form of Council Directive 77/92/EEC of 13 
December 1976 on measures to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services in respect of the activities of insurance 
agents and brokers (ex ISIC Group 630) and, in particular, transitional measures in 
respect of those activities. The directive formed very general obligations for Member 
States for requirements which they can impose on insurance intermediaries and 
obligations to accept certificates from different Member States. 
 
However, the actual protection of the client was introduced first in 1990s with the 
92/48/EEC: Commission Recommendation of 18 December 1991 on insurance 
intermediaries. Whereas the Council Directive 77/92/EC has outlined only formal 
requirements for qualification acceptance and market admission based in other 
Member State’s law or decisions, the Commission Recommendation of 18 December 
1991 already drafted the first requirements for insurance intermediaries, since it was 
desirable to introduce them in order to secure minimum level of qualification and 
knowledge across the European Communities7. The Council Recommendation did not 
only establish the common demand regarding knowledge but also to obtain indemnity 
insurance. Furthermore, also the good reputation demand was anchored as well as duty 
for Member States to establish a register and competent authority for supervision. The 
document advises the Member States to enforce the rules with sanctions.  
 
                                                          
 





The provision of the Council Recommendation were rather general (and therefore left 
a big space for Member State‘s consideration) and could not support common market 
efficiently enough8, which subsequently led to need for further harmonization rules. 
The complex legislation which aimed to give a common framework for some 
important parts of insurance distribution was the Directive 2002/92/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 9 December 2002 on insurance mediation 
(hereinafter Insurance Mediation Directive or IMD). The IMD became applicable on 
15 January 2003, the Member States had to transpose it until 15 January 2005. 
However, the provisions of the Insurance Mediation Directive left a big discretion area 
for the Member States so that the transposition was done in each country differently 
leaving some blank spaces9. In addition, building up common market in insurance was 
seen as insufficiently supported by the IMD10.  
 
At the same time as the impact assessment was conducted, revision of several related 
legislations was planned and being prepared, namely Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID II)11 and the directive which regulates the risk-based approach to 
capitalisation and supervision of insurance undertakings (Solvency II)12. Therefore, it 
became logical to revise and amend insurance mediation law as well. 
 
Initially the aim was targeted to create IMD recast rather than a completely new act. 
However, one of the key changes was widening the scope of the directive so that it 
would include nearly all distribution channels, not only intermediaries. For this reason 
the original Insurance Mediation Directive recast was transformed into Insurance 
                                                          
8 Opinion Of The Economic And Social Committee On The "Proposal For A Directive Of The European 
Parliament And Of The Council On Insurance Mediation", Point 1.2 
9 Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
AND OF THE COUNCIL on insurance mediation (recast), point 1 
10 CEIOPS’ Report On The Implementation Of The Insurance Mediation Directive’s Key Provisions. 
P. 25. In: CEIOPS. CEIOPS-DOC-09/07 [online]. March 2007 [cit. 2017-04-25]. 
11 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU 
12 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the 




Distribution Directive to have a more accurate name. IDD became effective on 22 
February 2016 and should be transposed until 1 July 201813. 
 
1.2 Insurance Distribution Directive 
The main impact area of Insurance Distribution Directive can be divided into seven 
groups: scope of the legislation, requirements on products themselves, disclosure and 
documentation, sales process, remuneration, requirements on distributors and freedom 
to provide services, new requirements for insurance-based investment products.  
 
1.2.1 Scope 
As was already mentioned above, IDD is applicable to more cases of insurance 
distribution than IMD. Article 1 (1) of Insurance Distribution Directive states: This 
Directive lays down rules concerning the taking-up and pursuit of the activities of 
insurance and reinsurance distribution in the Union. While Article 1 (1) of Insurance 
Mediation Directive states: This Directive lays down rules for the taking-up and 
pursuit of the activities of insurance and reinsurance mediation by natural and legal 
persons which are established in a Member State or which wish to become established 
there. Neglecting the reformulation of geographical applicability, the important 
change has been by replacing the word “mediation” with word “distribution”. In order 
to see what the real impact of this replacement is, we need to check the definitions 
provisions in both directives. The difference is that so called comparison platforms14 
have been included in the scope of IDD.  
 
Even though this amendment will affect the comparison platforms significantly, from 
larger point of view, it is not as essential as the change in negative delimitation in the 
scope of both directives. Firstly, some products under certain circumstances do not fall 
                                                          
13 Originally, the transposition date was set on 23 February 2018 but was postponed by Directive (EU) 
2018/411 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2018 amending Directive (EU) 
2016/97 as regards the date of application of Member States' transposition measures 
14 Defined in Article 2 (1) second part, IDD which states: including the provision of information 
concerning one or more insurance contracts in accordance with criteria selected by customers through 
a website or other media and the compilation of an insurance product ranking list, including price and 
product comparison, or a discount on the price of an insurance contract, when the customer is able to 




under the scope of any of the directives.15. Secondly, omitting provision of Article 1 
(3) of IMD in the IDD has caused that the IDD is applicable also to insurance 
undertakings and their employees. Exemption of employees of insurance undertakings 
from IMD application was subject to ECJ decision16: Employees of insurance 
undertakings not operating on behalf and within the relationship to their employer (i.e. 
insurance undertaking) could not pursue activities of insurance mediation unless 
fulfilling professional requirement under IMD. If such employees operate within the 
relationship with their employers, IMD does not apply to them.  
 
The question is how big the impact on consumer protection will be. Allegedly, the 
market share covered by IDD will be 98% compared to 48% by IMD17. However, the 
numbers of affected clients vary from country to country as for instance in Croatia 
direct writers hold 70% of the market in non-life insurance counted by premiums sold, 
nearly 50% in Finland, around 35% in France and Malta, but only approximately 5% 
in Denmark, Italy, Portugal and Turkey.18 Figures for life insurance are less favourable 
for direct writers as the biggest market share is in Croatia again and takes about 45% 
followed by Netherlands and Slovakia with 35%, while Denmark, Malta and Portugal 
stand on the other end of the scale with 3% of direct writers’ market share19.  
 
Such big differences in impact area based on the Member States must necessarily lead 
to unequal level of consumer protection across the European Union, therefore the 
author regards the extension of scope to insurance undertakings as a positive step 
forward in clients’ protection. Furthermore, equalizing of regulatory requirements for 
majority of the market has positive effect on competition and support building 
common market and can bring advantages for the clients in the end as well. 
                                                          
15 See Article 1 (3), IDD and Article 1 (2), IMD. 
16 Judgment of 17 October 2013, Simvoulio tis Epikratias, C-555/11, EU:C:2013:668, para. 32 
17 The Insurance Distribution Directive: changes to the regulation of insurance intermediaries in the 
EU [online]. February 2016 [cit. 2017-04-24]. Available at: https://www.out-
law.com/en/topics/insurance/insurance-brokers-and-intermediaries/the-insurance-distribution-
directive-changes-to-the-regulation-of-insurance-intermediaries-in-the-eu/  
18  INSURANCE EUROPE. European Insurance In Figures: 2015 data [online]. P. 44. December 2016 
[cit. 2018-04-26]. Available at: 
https://www.insuranceeurope.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/European%20Insurance%20in%20Fig
ures%20-%202015%20data.pdf . 




Another change in scope concerns ancillary insurance intermediaries. Ancillary 
insurance intermediaries distribute insurance complementary to goods or service, do 
so for remuneration but not as their principal activity and they must not distribute 
certain types of insurance products. Recital 8, IDD provides examples of ancillary 
insurance intermediaries as travel agents or car rental companies. Originally ancillary 
insurance intermediaries have been exempted from the scope of Insurance Mediation 
Directive20, now Insurance Distribution Directive shall apply to them too with less 
strict regime. Member States can introduce lighter knowledge requirements with 
regard to the products sold by ancillary intermediaries. On the other hand, ancillary 
intermediaries need to have indemnity insurance, its limits are however not set 
precisely and left to Member States’ consideration21. Ancillary intermediaries must 
comply with some information disclosure requirements and conflict of interest 
measures. Such setup can lead us to the idea that the legislator contemplated the 
possible impact on business and compared the possible advantages for clients with 
burdens imposed on intermediaries who carry out the activity only as ancillary and 
kept the requirements which are able to help client directly but which do not oppress 
the ancillary intermediary significantly. 
 
We shall not omit to discuss negative scope definition of IDD, provided in Article 2 
(2) and explained in Recitals 12-15, which exclude certain activities from the scope of 
the directive. Excluded activities are: provision of data or information on potential 
policyholders to insurance distributors without actual contract conclusion, vice versa 
information provision about insurance or reinsurance products without assisting with 
contract conclusion (e.g. comparison websites which does only compare and inform 
but not provide policy, that means they do not conclude contracts). Furthermore, 
certain activities in management of claims are also excluded – loss adjusting or claims 
appraisals. Last, incidental information in the context of another professional activity 
provision without assisting with contract conclusion (e.g. tax experts, lawyers or 
accountants).  
                                                          
20 E.g. Recital 13 of IMD 




Insurance Distribution Directive introduces in Article 25 new set of requirements 
regarding product oversight and governance (POG). These rules are applicable both to 
insurance undertakings and insurance intermediaries when they manufacture an 
insurance product, some of the rules (regarding knowledge and information on the 
product) are applicable to the distributors who do not manufacture the product. 
Commission is empowered to adopt delegated acts to further specify the requirements 
in Article 25, IDD. 
 
Commission invited European Insurance and Occupational Pension Authority 
(EIOPA) to provide technical advice on the delegated acts according to Article 25, 
IDD22. EIOPA firstly published preparatory technical guidelines on product oversight 
and governance23, opened public consultation and later amended the guidelines and 
released joint report on all the delegated acts according to IDD24. 
 
The above elaborated technical advice served as a basis for Commission Regulation25 
(referred to also as ‘Product Governance Commission Regulation’). Its two main 
chapters provide requirements for insurance manufacturers and insurance distributors.  
The first group of requirements begin with product approval process which shall 
ensure that products are designated and maintained in a way which ensures consumer’s 
benefit, mainly by taking into account consumer’s interest, objectives and 
characteristics and by preventing conflict of interest. Closely linked to these objectives 
                                                          
22 GUERSENT, Olivier. Request For EIOPA To Provide Technical Advice On Possible Delegated Acts 
Concerning The Insurance Distribution Directive. 2016. [cit. 2017-04-26]. Available at: 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Requests%20for%20advice/I-EIOPA-2016-
073%20COM%20Letter%20IDD%20%28GBE%29.pdf.  
23 EIOPA. Final Report On Public Consultation On Preparatory Technical Guidelines On Product 
Oversight And Governance Arrangements By Insurance Undertakings And Insurance Distributors. In: 
EIOPA-BoS-16/071, [online] 2016, 6 April 2016 [cit. 2017-04-26]. Available at: 
https://eiopa.europa.eu/publications/reports/final%20report%20on%20pog%20guidelines.pdf.  
24 EIOPA. Consultation Paper On Technical Advice On Possible Delegated Acts Concerning The 
Insurance Distribution Directive. In: EIOPA-CP-16/006 [online]. 2016, 4 July 2016 [cit. 2017-04-26]. 
Available at: https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Consultations/EIOPA-CP-16-
006_Consultation_Paper_on_IDD_delegated_acts.pdf. 
25 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/2358 of 21 September 2017 supplementing Directive 
(EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to product oversight and 




is defining target market for the product, the process is outlined in Article 5 of the 
Product Governance Commission Regulation. Manufacturers need to assess the 
financial literacy of and information available to the target market group. The product 
shall be tested before its release to market and then constantly monitored throughout 
its whole existence, its suitability for target individuals shall be re-assessed. Potential 
detriments on consumers shall be prevented and, when not possible, at least mitigated. 
Events which have influence on the state of insurance product can include changes in 
laws, technology or market. The need to re-assess the product depends on its nature.26 
Last, insurance manufacturers are liable also for selection and monitoring of 
distribution channels and also provide necessary information to them, which shall 
ensure understanding and knowledge of the insurance product and its target market 
(including both positive and negative definition). Compliance with manufacturer’s 
obligations shall be documented, beside that Product oversight and governance policy 
shall be adopted in every manufacturing entity.  
 
Distributor’s obligations under the Product Governance Commission Regulation 
correspond with the manufacturer’s obligations in terms of customer’s protection. 
Distributors shall adopt arrangements for product distributions in order to mitigate 
possible consumer’s detriment, manage conflict of interest and provide services 
suitable for the specific customer. Distributors shall inform the manufacturers about 
any discrepancies between (target market) consumer’s interest and the product 
characteristics. These obligations require that reliable and regular communication 
channels work between the distributor and manufacturer. The distributor shall also 
monitor and adapt the distribution process when it does not meet the requirement 
according to the Product Governance Commission Regulation. 
 
It needs to be emphasized that product oversight and governance requirements are not 
matter of one-time review but they require constant process of monitoring and 
procedures evaluating. The manufacturers and distributors need to flexibly react on 
issues arising from the market and its development.  
  
                                                          




The setup of the product oversight and governance provisions shall ensure that 
consumer’s interests are protected and supported at two stages – not only during 
insurance product distribution but already in the process of product development. That 
means that the responsibility lies with both distributor and the manufacturer27.  
 
As the above stated facts suggest, Article 25, IDD impact significantly both the 
insurance undertakings and insurance intermediaries. Therefore, we should ask 
ourselves if the required measures can effectively enhance the level of client’s 
protection.  
 
The aim to determine the target market and create tailor made product for a certain 
group of people seems legitimate. But would not a reasonable company set up target 
clients when developing a new product? Is not meeting client’s needs the main purpose 
of trade (in broad sense) and the basic principle why the exchange among people 
works? Nowadays the offered products, solutions and services are so sophisticated that 
it is difficult for an ordinary person to understand them completely, especially when 
considering the wide range of products which a person needs, that is why presenting 
target customers can be helpful. On the other hand, Insurance Distribution Directive 
does not protect only consumers as natural person but all customers in insurance 
business. Is there then the need to protect other enterprises? Insurance of large risks is 
exempted from the Article 25, IDD, however it does not have to be always large risk 
which a company needs to insure but it can be often a risk which is outside of ordinary 
business for the company, such as car fleet insurance. If respectable insurance 
companies conduct target market evaluation, the regulation does not oppress them too 
much with such requirements (the only extra activity would be the obligation to have 
and provide documentation in such case). If a business does not conduct target market 
evaluation, is it worth protection? Furthermore, such measures can contribute to single 
market building as businesses in some countries, where the competition among 
insurance undertakings is not very strong, must comply with same rules as anywhere 
                                                          
27 CAPPIELLO, Antonella. Technology and the Insurance Industry: Re-configuring the Competitive 
Landscape. Springer, 2018. P. 22. ISBN 3319747126. 
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in the European Union. POG requirements may have significant impact on certain 
policies with saving elements because their target market cannot be defined as the 
whole retail market as it is now28. 
 
The need to observe and take remedial actions can, according to author’s opinion, 
contribute significantly to the protection of consumers as it is based on real issues and 
concerns also individual cases.  
 
The obligations on information provided to distributors and selection of suitable 
channels are also in the best interest of the manufacturer as it may harm its good repute. 
Above all, the distributor is the one who shall notice issues with consumers as soon as 
they occur and inform the manufacturer so that it can reflect it in the product 
development29. Having efficient manufacturing process but malfunctioning 
distribution circumvent the purpose of the POG requirements. 
 
The only extra requirement which could be regarded as unnecessary burden is the 
compulsory documentation because the insurance undertakings and distributors would 
normally not maintain extensive record on their steps when doing activities under 
POG. The author thinks that Product Governance Commission Regulation does not 
require unreasonable level of administrative measures – for insurance manufacturers, 
it is product oversight and governance policy, which shall be a standard guideline with 
insurance undertakings; for insurance distributors, it is written document with 
insurance distribution requirements. Both groups shall duly document compliance 
with Product Governance Commission Regulation, such requirement is only natural 
and cannot be regarded excessive or unreasonable. 
 
1.2.3 Disclosure and documentation 
The legislation in force - Insurance Mediation Directive contains rules on information 
disclosure30. The rules regulate the time, form and content of the information. 
                                                          
28 Ibid., p. 22-23. 
29 Ibid., p.23. 
30 Chapter III, IMD. 
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Insurance Distribution Directive takes over the existing requirements, divide them into 
several articles and further elaborates them.  
 
Regarding timing the information shall be provided “…in good time before the 
conclusion of an insurance contract…”31 Exceptionally, for the cases, when providing 
the information prior to contract conclusion is not possible due to well-founded 
objective (sales over telephone call), the distributor must do so immediately 
afterwards32.  
 
According to Article 23, IDD the information must be in paper form (or on durable 
medium or on website, if the customer has given their consent and other defined 
requirements have been met), written in a for customer understandable manner, in one 
of European Union’s official languages and the information must be provided free of 
charge. Prioritization of paper form is apparent from Article 23 (3), IDD, which states 
that the customer can always request free paper copy. Such setup is understandable 
because many European citizens are not able to work with digital content or they are 
not at least comfortable with digital forms of information provision. In the author’s 
opinion, IDD chose right option with forms of information provisions even though we 
may question its practicality in the upcoming years when digitalization will progress 
and IDD shall still be in force. 
 
The content of the information can be divided based on its nature into general 
information, conflict of interest and transparency disclosure and product information 
document. 
 
General information according to Article 18, IDD shall be provided to customer with 
information about the person of the distributor (irrespective of whether it is an 
insurance intermediary or an insurance undertaking), whether the distributor provides 
advice, also information about possibility of complaints and out-of-court redress 
according to Articles 14 and 15. Insurance intermediary shall provide information 
                                                          
31 See Article 18 (a) and (b), Article 19 (1) and (4), compare Article 20 (4), Article 23 (7), IDD. 
32 See Article 23 (7), IDD. 
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about his or her professional registration and whether he or she “…is representing the 
customer or is acting for and on behalf of the customer or of the insurance 
undertaking.” 
 
Pursuant to Article 19, IDD possible conflict of interest shall be disclosed to the 
customer in a way that the distributor informs them about his or her holdings (10% or 
more percent) in the insurance undertaking whose product is in question or if the 
insurance undertaking has holding in the insurance intermediary’s company. In 
relation to the contract in question the distributor must disclose whether he or she does 
or does not give advice based on a fair and personal analysis and whether he or she 
acts exclusively for one or more insurance undertakings and if this can have impact on 
the advice given.  
 
Insurance Product Information Document (IPID) is a new tool for information form 
simplification and is compulsory only for non-life insurance products as stated in 
Article 20 (5)33 . Commission, based on EIOPA draft, adopted IPID implementing 
regulation34, which contains instruction for creating IPID and template of the 
document. It corresponds with the requirements outlined in Article 20 (7), IDD on the 
information quality and form written in the IPID. The requirements traditionally aim 
to make the document “consumer friendly” (e.g. short, understandable, accurate, not-
misleading, legible). Summarizing the essential aspects of insurance policy in an easily 
comprehensible way may be very helpful for customers. On the other hand, it 
introduces risks that consumers may confuse IPID for the actual contract and be 
negatively surprised by the information which is not contained in IPID but is important 
feature of the contract. Some distributors may even abuse this possibility and draft 
IPID and contract in a misleading way. 
 
However, in order to ease the detriment caused by the disclosure obligation provisions 
to the insurance distributors and insurance undertakings and to address the customers 
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who really need such information, majority of the disclosure provisions are not 
applicable to insurance of large risks35. 
 
Insurance distribution directive newly introduces requirements (in form of obligations 
to Member States to ensure them) which are general principles on conduct rules for 
insurance distributors, who must act “…honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interests of their customers.” Member States shall also 
guarantee quality of client’s communication related to insurance distribution as the 
communication must be fair, clear and not misleading. Additionally, the distributors 
must ensure that marketing communication can be easily identified as such. 
 
As we have seen, the regulation of information and their disclosure are quite extensive. 
Does it affect rather quantity or quality? Does the regulation bring the desirable effect 
on customer’s protection?  
 
The demands on suitable timing and form of the provided information provided are 
not very revolutionary in the field of consumer protection36, it might though be quite 
helpful for customers who are not consumers but who can use the regulation’s 
advantages too.  
 
The more interesting part of the regulation is the one on content of the information 
provided. General information about the insurance distributor and the insurance 
undertaking are usually given to customer without legal requirement, on the other hand 
it might be helpful to argue with legal requirement in case of dispute. Information 
about the possibility to raise complaint and where and about the possibility to resolve 
potential disputes are definitely very useful to the customer as not everyone might be 
aware of them. The complaints and alternative dispute resolution shall serve to a 
                                                          
35 Article 22, IDD. 
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of consumers in respect of distance contracts and Directive 2011/83/EU Of The European Parliament 
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purpose of protecting one self’s rights without fear of lengthy and costly process before 
court37. The alternative dispute resolution mechanism shall also support building of 
single market in the European Union as it enables fast and efficient resolution of cross-
border disputes. However, the obligation to inform customers about complaints and 
out-of-court redress must be evaluated as positive but does not guarantee that the 
customers will take action to enforce their rights and that they will succeed. Of course, 
this cannot be realistically achieved by any legislation. 
 
Informing the customer whether the insurance distributor provide advice on the 
product is quite questionable. According to the author, customers may pay attention to 
the real meaning of what the insurance intermediary is telling them – specifically, 
consumers may realize, thanks to the written notice, whether the ‘opinions’ of the 
intermediary are really independent recommendations or if it only sound like them but 
in fact only promote certain products. On the other hand, it is likely that most of the 
customers would not contemplate real meaning of the information whether advice is 
being given and skip it while studying all other provided information., In addition, 
many distributors may be quite manipulative speakers and may persuade consumers 
that they are skilled advisors providing elaborated recommendations while not giving 
advice at all. The restriction in Article 17 (1), IDD could not prevent this as it is 
difficult to prove manipulation and makes sense to raise the objection only in case of 
dispute. 
 
Disclosure of conflict of interest relates to relationship of ownership kind between an 
intermediary and an insurance undertaking and to advice on basis of fair and personal 
analysis. The author seriously doubts whether ordinary consumers contemplate 
property interests of their counterparties when closing an insurance contract. We need 
to consider the insurance premium and other costs of the contract for the customer as 
playing more important role in the decision making. It is likely that the consumers 
would be more cautious in case of life insurance or expensive non-life insurance but it 
is unlikely that they would give attention to information about the relationship of the 
                                                          
37 Recital 4 of the Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 
on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
and Directive 2009/22/EC. 
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insurance intermediary and insurance undertaking. On the other hand, an experienced 
businessperson could take this into account but the cases are limited as insurance of 
large risks is exempt from the disclosure obligation. Therefore, the author cannot say 
with certainty whether the obligation is beneficial for the consumer. 
 
Insurance product information document is a new element in insurance distribution as 
it has not been part of the Insurance Mediation Directive. Considering all advantages 
and disadvantages of it, it seems to be a positive change. The obligation to create and 
distribute IPID cannot burden the product manufacturer and distributor in significant 
way while it can ease seeking for information from the client’s side. For a client who 
wants to make informed decision and contemplate diligently entering into insurance 
contract it can provide essential support. 
 
The requirement of a consumer-friendly form is complementary to the above stated 
measures on information disclosure. Receiving information which are hardly 
understandable even for an experienced professional would not support customer in 
making informed decision. If there was no provision regulating the language and 
format of the information, preparing complicated and illegible documents would be 
possibly in fraudem legis as it serves to circumvent the purpose of the legislation. 
 
Provisions regarding conduct rules for insurance distributors are very general and 
difficult to evaluate as they are only basis and command for Member States to adopt 
legislation which shall ensure fair dealing. What seems apparent even now is that it 
would be very problematic to draft regulation which could fulfil the requirements. The 
author sees more potential of the conduct rules as supportive arguments in case of 
dispute. They shall also serve as prevention - for licencing and inspections of 
supervising authorities. Rules of conduct can contribute to ethical behaviour on 
insurance market but the determination to abide with them must arise from the 
company itself, a forced compliance cannot work.  
 
To sum up the information disclosure part, the requirements and rules are generally 
able to support and ease decision making of a customer when the customer is willing 
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to contemplate the contract diligently. The provisions can be very beneficial to 
customers with financial literacy and some level of experience but would not probably 
help to everyone. 
 
1.2.4 Sales process 
The part on sales process examines the conditions for advised and non-advised sales 
and rules on cross-selling and bundled products.  
 
To distinguish between advised and non-advised sales, we shall define what “giving 
advice” means. Advice is given when the insurance distributor recommends 
individually based on his or her personal opinion regardless whether it happens from 
his or her own initiative or because the client asked for the advice. The distributor shall 
always (both when giving and not giving advice) delimitate the demands and needs of 
the individual customer considering the information provided by the customer. The 
insurance distributor shall then inform the customer about main characteristics of the 
specific insurance product. The provided information should be objective and given in 
an intelligible way. The consecutive contract must meet the demands and needs of the 
customer. If the insurance distributor gives advice, it must be in a form of personalised 
recommendation explaining why this particular product meets the customer’s 
requirement best. All the above stated must correspond with the specialities of the 
offered insurance product, especially its complexity and parameters.  
 
Article 20 (3), IDD contains one more provision regulating advised sales: ‘Where an 
insurance intermediary informs the customer that it gives its advice on the basis of a 
fair and personal analysis, it shall give that advice on the basis of an analysis of a 
sufficiently large number of insurance contracts available on the market to enable it 
to make a personal recommendation, in accordance with professional criteria, 
regarding which insurance contract would be adequate to meet the customer’s needs.’ 
What a fair and personal analysis really means is not very clear in this context, the 
preamble of Insurance Distribution Directive does not give us insight as its Recital 47 
states that each case must be regarded individually based on the evaluation of each 
customer’s needs and the market situation. Member States can however impose 
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additional requirements such as providing advice in all sales and not only in some of 
them. 
 
Providing advice (specifically the fact whether advice was provided) can affect also 
duties of insurance providers in some jurisdictions. Insurance undertakings may be 
obliged to warn customers when there are gaps in insurance policy, unless the customer 
has discussed the insurance policy with insurance broker who shall give him or her 
advice, including potential gaps38. 
 
In case of tied insurance intermediaries, it might be more difficult to ascertain whether 
he or she can compare sufficient number of insurance policies when he or she 
distributes products of one or only a few insurers. The author believes that tied 
insurance intermediaries need to consider sufficient number of insurance policies in 
their scope. In case they are not able to do so, e.g. because they offer very limited range 
of insurance products, they shall not declare that they provide independent advice. 
Especially for insurance intermediaries tied to only one insurer, providing independent 
advice is hardly possible, unless the specific insure offers more insurance policies 
which cover sufficient proportion of the market or is exclusive provider of that certain 
insurance product (which might be applicable for non-traditional and unusual types of 
insurance policies). 
 
To conclude the topic of advised and non-advised sales, the author must state that the 
provisions of IDD are so general that they shall be deemed as guidance and support 
for supervising bodies rather than ultimate requirements. 
 
Insurance Distribution Directive newly introduces rules on cross-selling and bundled 
products. The main change is the obligation for insurance distributors to inform 
customers about bundled product, about the possibility to buy the bundled products 
separately and the restrictions for creating bundled products. IDD also authorizes 
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EIOPA to provide guidelines ‘…for the assessment and the supervision of cross-selling 
practices indicating situations in which cross-selling practices are not compliant with 
the obligations laid down in Article 17.’ (Article 24 (4), IDD). However, EIOPA has 
not published the prospective guidelines until April 2018. IDD also leaves a possibility 
to Member States to adopt stricter rules on the topic and abolish providing services in 
which insurance plays an ancillary role and which might be detrimental to customers. 
The detriment must be demonstrated though. 
 
1.2.5 Remuneration 
Insurance Distribution Directive introduces new rules on remuneration and its 
disclosure to customers. The objective is to provide them with information about type 
of remuneration and information indicating the level of independence to an insurance 
undertaking and to a specific product too. It is essential to emphasize that the 
remuneration disclosure is mandatory not only for insurance intermediaries but also 
for insurance undertakings, those are also required to inform customers about the 
nature of remuneration their employees are given. Such measures shall preserve the 
market balance.39  
 
Secondly, the rules on remuneration as well as insurance undertakings remuneration 
policies must not hinder the aim to provide impartial advice (in a broader sense) to the 
customers to follow the requirements on fair, clear and not misleading distribution. 
Remuneration based on sales targets should not provide an incentive to recommend a 
particular product to the customer40. 
 
IDD rules on disclosure related to remuneration are contained in Article 19 as 
provisions regarding conflict of interest and transparency. We have already discussed 
these issues partially in the part on disclosure and documentation, however not in 
relation to remuneration. IDD requires the intermediaries to inform their customers 
about nature of remuneration which can be in form of fee, commission or other kind 
of remuneration or combination of these types. Fee means a payment made directly by 
                                                          
39 IDD rec. 40, 41 
40 IDD, rec. 46 
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the customer while a commission is paid by the insurance provider to insurance 
intermediary as remuneration for conclusion of the insurance contract, for customers 
it means they pay it indirectly as a (hidden) percentage of the insurance premium which 
makes the premium more expensive.. Other types of remuneration are a residual 
category which shall cover any economic benefit arising from insurance contract 
conclusion. On the other hand, insurance undertakings must inform only about the 
nature of remuneration of their employees. The requirements on insurance 
intermediaries in these matters are coming directly from the IDD while the 
requirements on insurance undertaking are expressed in the form, that member states 
shall ensure that they are fulfilled. Member states are expected to do so by means of 
requirements on individual remuneration policies of insurance undertakings41. 
Customers must be informed about amount of fee to be paid and also about other 
payments which are to be paid after the contract conclusion (with exception of 
premiums and scheduled payments). All the necessary disclosure must take place good 
time before contract conclusion. Furthermore, Member States can limit or prohibit the 
acceptance of any kind of benefits provided from third parties in connection to 
insurance products distribution42. 
 
Finally, it is not possible to give clear answer to the question of overall contribution of 
remuneration disclosure to customer’s protection. Surely it can help to create a clearer 
view on the behaviour of the insurance distributor and on the reason why certain 
product is being offered. On the other hand, the expected benefit is always limited by 
level of financial literacy and interest of an ordinary customer.  
 
1.2.6 Professional requirements 
Provisions of Article 10, IDD contain tasks imposed upon Member States to ensure 
certain level of professional skills both for insurance intermediaries and insurance 
undertakings and their employees. Insurance Mediation Directive has already outlined 
main obligations regarding professional skills, however the rules were more general 
                                                          
41 Ibid. 
42 IDD, Article 22 (3). 
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than those required by IDD and they were applicable only to insurance intermediaries 
while IDD covers also insurance undertakings and their employees. 
 
IDD preserves the obligation introduced by IMD to have appropriate knowledge and 
abilities but goes further. Insurance distributors shall maintain their skills by taking 
annual trainings. Member States shall create their own rules on insurance distributors’ 
knowledge and performance improvement or at least maintaining while they shall 
require at least 15 hours of professional training each year. Member States can also 
require certificate as evidence of the completion of the training. IDD (and IMD too) 
does not impose these requirements on all natural persons working for an insurance 
undertaking, it only required some of the management as well as employees working 
in insurance distribution to be compliant. IDD specifies the minimum professional 
knowledge and competence requirements in Annex I. It outlines three categories based 
on the product type: non-life insurance products, insurance-based investment products 
and life insurance products. While some of the requirements are common for all 
categories43, some of them reflects the specifics of the relevant product44.  
 
Another professional requirement imposed upon insurance distributors under IDD is 
being of good repute. Good repute is linked to clean criminal record (for offences 
related to insurance and financial services) and to bankruptcy (unless rehabilitated). 
Insurance distributors are allowed to check criminal records of their employees and 
insurance intermediaries (in accordance with rules on intermediaries’ registration). 
 
Closely linked to the professional requirements outlined above is registration 
procedures since all insurance (also ancillary) intermediaries shall be registered 
according to Article 3, IDD. Insurance intermediaries shall obtain the registration only 
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if they meet certain professional requirements45 Registration was part of IMD in quite 
similar extent as is now in IDD (we can date it even more further to the past as it was 
one of the objective of the Commission Recommendation 92/48/EEC of 18 December 
1991 on insurance intermediaries).  
 
Purpose of this registration is outlined in the recitals46 of both directives. One of them 
is to enhance the mobility inside the EU (and therefore support freedom to provide 
services and freedom of establishment). The above shall be attained i.a. by the 
obligation to register only in the home Member State without need to do so in every 
Member State where services are provided. However, answer to the question where 
registration of insurance intermediaries, in case of cross-border activity, shall take 
place (whether in the home Member State or in the hosting one) was not clear. 
Approach of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision prevailed and the Member 
State where the insurance intermediary is authorised oversights also the activities in 
other Member States. Given the limited powers to restrict entry of the host Member 
State it was naturally necessary to harmonise the law across the EU to minimum 
standards. This follows the development of authorisation and supervision rights of 
states – at first, host countries were those who allowed entry into market (deciding 
based solely on nationality was forbidden), insurance intermediaries established in a 
Member State could operate in another Member State without need to authorize. 
Finally, as the merge of the two previous scenarios, intermediaries authorised in a 
Member State could entry the market in another Member State without further 
authorization47.  
 
The other purpose of registration is to improve consumer protection within the 
common market. This shall be achieved by means of exchange of information among 
national authorities responsible for registration of insurance intermediaries. The 
information exchange rule assumes that insurance intermediaries are active in more 
than one country. The question is what percentage of insurance intermediaries is active 
                                                          
45 Recital 18 in fine, IDD. 
46 Recitals 20 and 34, IDD, Recital 8 and 15, IMD. 
47 LOWRY, John and P.J. RAWLINGS. Insurance Law: Cases and Materials. London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2004. Chapter 2.7. ISBN 1782253459, 9781782253457.  
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in more than one country. Since no exact data on the percentage exist we have to make 
deductions. One of them is the assumption that rather large insurance intermediaries 
are active in more EU countries. The existing researches on the percentage of large 
intermediaries and their clients’ portfolio indicates the following: Firstly, large 
insurance brokers do not cover very high market share48. Secondly, large insurance 
brokers provide services to big companies while small insurance intermediaries deal 
with small and medium enterprises49. Such setup leads to conclusion that the regulation 
of insurance intermediaries’ registration does not particularly protects the clients who 
need it most – consumers.  
 
 IDD take a stance of minimum harmonisation in the area of registration as it only 
foresees the desired state of protection and rather outlines specific rules on the national 
registers and special cases50. Member States implementing law will have a big impact 
and can bring significant differences into insurance law in the EU. 
 
The provisions on registration clearly follow the purpose to control the quality of 
insurance intermediaries by setting conditions for registration, e.g. fulfilment of 
professional requirements51, disclosure of closely linked persons or shareholders with 
more than 10% share in the intermediary52. The role of the register to pre-emptively 
forbid unreliable persons from activity. 
 
1.2.7 Insurance-based investment products 
Insurance mediation directive did not content special regulation of insurance-based 
investment products (IBIPs). Under light of revision of legislation on Market in 
Financial Instruments Directive and Packaged Retail Investment Products Regulation, 
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revision of IMD needed to comply with the requirements imposed on products with 
investment elements53. 
  
Provision of Article 2 (17), IDD contains definition of IBIPs: …’an insurance product 
which offers a maturity or surrender value and where that maturity or surrender value 
is wholly or partially exposed, directly or indirectly, to market fluctuations…’ then 
follows negative definition of the product which could be summarized in this way: life 
insurance product which is not payable only in case of death or complete incapacity, 
pension product serving only as an income in retirement, occupational pension scheme 
or pension product, compulsory pension product with employer’s financial 
contribution. To sum up, IBIP is no mere insurance product but a capital investment 
disguised in an insurance product, e.g. unit-linked insurance plan.54 
 
Insurance Distribution Directive regulates provision of insurance-based investment 
products in Chapter IV which introduces additional requirements regarding conflict of 
interest and its prevention, information to customers, assessment of suitability and 
appropriateness and reporting to customers. However, these rules are applicable only 
to two types of distribution – insurance intermediaries and insurance undertakings. It 
needs to be emphasized that all the requirements are additional to the general ones 
which are applicable to majority of insurance products, this means the general 
requirements must be fulfilled as well.  
 
Conflict of Interest 
The issue of conflict of interest arises mainly from the various activities which an 
insurance undertaking or intermediary does and the range of client it has. Insurance 
distribution directive foresees two types of measures which shall contribute to avoid 
conflict of interest – prevention and reaction to an existing conflict of interest by 
informing the affected clients. The legislation is conceived so that prevention is 
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important and essential part of the solution, while informing the clients shall serve only 
as an emergency option55. Not all conflict of interest cases can be avoided, so that the 
desired state is to treat conflicts of interests fairly, such an approach was taken e.g. in 
the UK before IDD was even published56. 
 
Prevention of detrimental effect of conflict of interest on clients can be ensured, 
pursuant to Article 27, IDD, by different measures such as organizational and 
administrative arrangements. According to EIOPA’s Draft Technical Advice57 the 
insurance undertaking or intermediary in question shall firstly identify the possible 
conflicts of interest (what kind and where it may arise), secondly it shall create conflict 
of interest policy.  
 
The Draft Technical Advice explains firstly what is conflict of interest (when interest 
of the insurance undertaking or intermediary is related to insurance distribution 
activities and is different from the customer’s one), who might happen to be in it 
(employees, managers, persons linked to the enterprise) and when it requires attention 
(when it may have negative impact on the services provided to the customer). 
Secondly, EIOPA indicates examples of situations which shall be always deemed as 
those with conflict of interest (gain profit, avoid loss; incentive to prefer someone’s 
interests; benefit related to the provided service received from someone else than the 
customer; employees in insurance distribution are involved in IBIPs development).  
 
According to EIOPA, the conflict of interest policy shall identify the situations of 
possible conflict of interest regarding the individual position of the insurance 
undertaking or intermediary and the group it may be involved in (such as concern or 
other related companies). The need for proportionality is highly emphasized but no 
indication or guidance for proportionality are given. However, EIOPA asks market 
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participants for information whether more detailed guidance is needed58. Furthermore, 
the insurance undertaking or intermediary shall explain which circumstances can be 
decisive for the question whether the conflict of interest may have negative effect on 
the customer and the services provided to him or her. As the next step the insurance 
undertaking or intermediary shall specify the procedures and measures which shall 
prevent any damages suffered by a client due to conflict of interest. The procedures 
and measures shall be proportionate and appropriate considering the size (also 
potential enterprise group membership) and type of business undertaken by the 
enterprise. EIOPA gives examples what shall be done in order to prevent detrimental 
impact on clients – dividing information channels within the company and among its 
employees, independent supervision of persons possibly situated in conflict of interest, 
remuneration and involvement of certain persons in insurance distribution. If all these 
measures and procedures fail to ensure fair dealing with the customer’s interest, 
EIOPA prescribes that the insurance undertaking or intermediary shall come with other 
possibilities how to control the conflict of interest. EIOPA however does not offer any 
examples and leaves this question without answer for creativity of individual 
companies. Prescription of other measures than the “basic ones” is linked to the 
premise that informing customers about the possible conflict of interest is per se 
insufficient to prevent the possible damages. EIOPA partly overtook in its draft 
technical advice the requirements of Article 28 (3), IDD, and further elaborated it. 
When informing the customers about the risk of conflict of interest the insurance 
intermediary or undertaking shall provide the information on durable medium. The 
customer shall be informed about the nature of the conflict of interest impending and 
about the measures and procedure which the insurance undertaking or intermediary 
has taken to avoid the risk or to mitigate it. Additionally, it must be stated – if it is the 
case - that all the steps were not sufficient and that the risks persist so that the customer 
must decide about the insurance distribution knowing about the conflict of interest. 
Insurance undertakings and intermediaries shall review their policies and also maintain 
a list of occurred and impending conflict of interest and report this its senior 
management at least annually.  
 
                                                          
58 Ibid., p. 44-45, para.  7 
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The author does not agree with EIOPA’s strategy. The author suggests that prevention 
of conflict of interest shall be divided into several sections: creating conflict of interest 
policy which establishes theoretical measures and approach to the issue and 
organizational and practical measures. Conflict of interest policy shall be understood 
both as a description of the measures taken to prevent detrimental effect on clients and 
as a guide for the employees and management of the company how to work and deal 
with the situations. The policy as a guidebook shall therefore outline the examples of 
conflict of interest situations as well as general definition of the situation, examples of 
correct reaction to the situation, to-do list, basic principles etc. The organizational 
measures are generally very similar like those suggested by EIOPA in its Draft 
Technical Advice. On the other hand, the author does not share EIOPA’s opinion that 
all the suggested examples must necessarily establish conflict of interest, tagging them 
as such may hinder their occurrence even though they might be beneficial for the 
customers (such as communication between the product development department and 
distribution as the distributors best know what the customers are asking for). To 
conclude, the author is not very optimistic about the efficiency of the system of control 
and prevention of conflict of interest. It may work in a bigger company where structure 
and hierarchy is necessary and the need for good repute is essential, but a small 
insurance intermediary (e.g. self-employed intermediary) can easily avoid fulfilment 
of the rules and even preparing such policy and conflict of interests list can be quite 
onerous for them and can be a useless administrative burden. This problem does not 
need to arise at all if the rule of proportionality of the arrangements according to the 
size and nature of business prescribes very low standards for such intermediaries, but 
it may not be the case as we don’t have exact rules available yet. The above stated 
issues repeatedly arise throughout the whole Insurance Distribution Directive as it is 
written for large insurance undertakings and intermediaries even though these are not 
the main type of insurance intermediaries who serve consumers, the group of 
customers who shall be protected most. 
 
Insurance Distribution Directive introduces also information obligation as part of the 
enhanced protection of IBIPs clients. According to Article 29 (1), IDD a client who 
received advice shall be provided with information whether their investment plan and 
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suitability of the product will be reassessed periodically pursuant to Article 30, IDD. 
Furthermore, the distributor shall warn the customer about specific risks and guide 
them in respect of proposed investment strategies. The insurance distributor is also 
obliged to provide information on the costs of the IBIPs and its distribution (fee for 
advice) and payment method. Costs for distribution and costs which are not linked to 
the investment risk itself shall be provided in aggregated form (or the opposite – 
specific costs of each item if the customer wish so). The aim of this requirement is to 
provide overview of the costs and charges and see the potential rentability of the 
investment product.  
 
Under the Article 29, IDD which is called Information to customers we can find also 
rules on incentives. These rules are in close connection to issue of conflict of interest 
which we discussed above. Incentive means any fee, commission or non-monetary 
payment and it shall not be provided when it may be detrimental to the costumer’s 
interest or circumvent the requirement for insurance distributors to act in the best 
interest for the customer.  
 
1.3 Conclusion 
Looking back at the core areas of customer protection in financial services, we shall 
now identify those which play the most significant role in insurance distribution in the 
EU. IDD focuses on disclosure and sales practices, prescribing disclosure of 
information about the insurance policies, insurance distributors and their relations to 
insurance undertakings and also about the main aspects of the service they are 
providing to the client in that particular case. Registration of insurance intermediaries 
plays one of the main roles in the law as it belongs to classic customer protection 
mechanisms. 
 
Rules of conduct and internal policies both within the insurance undertaking and 
insurance intermediary are very important as well. Product oversight and governance 
is closely linked to this area. It represents interesting and new approach to consumer 
protection as it covers the whole lifecycle of insurance policy and shall serve as 
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prevention of consumer’s detriment. It also deepens the relationship between insurance 
provider and distributor. 
 
IDD is quite progressive legal regulation which has potential to help consumers 
significantly. It also evens the playing field in terms of regulated subjects – its scope 
covers now nearly all distribution channels - and the protected subject as it provides 
protection not only to consumers but also to customers who are not consumers with 
exemption of large risks insurance in some cases. 
 
Weak point of IDD is promoting financial literacy among customers was not 
incorporated into the directive. It is very complicated area for any law but it is so 




2. Banking law 
2.1 Introduction 
Client’s protection in banking law is determined by the objective of responsible 
lending which can include prevention of over-indebtedness, financial inclusion and 
also other measures. Responsible lending is of broad interest globally and countries 
take different approaches to secure it. As we already mentioned before, according to 
World Bank59 there are areas of measures to secure protection of consumers in 
financial services business – consumer protection institutions, disclosure and sales 
practices, customer account handling and maintenance (management), privacy and 
data protection, dispute resolution mechanisms, guarantee and compensation schemes 
(for the case of financial distress of the credit provider), financial literacy and 
consumer empowerment, competition (among the credit providers). In this part we will 
closely look at the measures which were adopted in the EU in the banking field, more 
precisely in credit business. 
 
European legislation on client’s protection in financial services is formed basically of 
Consumer Credit Directive60 (hereinafter ‘CCD’), Payment Services Directive61, 
Mortgage Credit Directive62 (hereinafter ‘MCD’) and also Directive on distance 
marketing of consumer financial services63. Payment services are out of scope of this 
work as they do not immediately have impact on financial situation of consumers, we 
shall focus now on Consumer Credit Directive and Mortgage Credit Directive. Distant 
                                                          




60 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC 
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marketing of consumer financial services is rather supportive to the consumer 
protection, so it is not primary topic of this work.  
 
2.1.1 Historical development 
The first pieces of legislation on consumer credit on the European level were two 
directives, one determining the conditions for credit providers64 and one outlining the 
minimum harmonization provisions regarding consumer credit65. By the time of 
introduction of the directives the need for approximation of laws in the area of financial 
services became more urgent and was logical outcome of the approximation 
tendencies66 in 1980s which followed after the European Court of Justice decision 
Cassis de Dijon67, howsoever concerning very different product than credit, and the 
previous directive concerning business of credit institutions68. The first consumer 
credit directive was formed mainly by information duties, rules concerning contract 
such as its conclusion, form, termination, content, annual percentage rate of charge, 
rules on advertising (mainly its content), assignment of claims from credit agreement, 
special rules on credit agreements for goods or services supply69. We will further 
discuss these topics when analyzing the second Consumer Credit Directive. Purpose 
of the first directive was to support common market, it was also the reason why it was 
possible to introduce the directive70.  
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The final text of the directive was a compromise reached after years of discussions, 
which was mirrored in the minimum level of harmonization contained in the 
provisions71. The fact, that the directive is a result of compromise, is illustrated by the 
calculation of annual percentage rate of charge which had been initially left in 
discretion of Member States (Article 1 (2)(e)). The calculation methods were added 
firstly by the amendment introduced by Council Directive 90/88/EEC of 22 February 
1990. Council Directive of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer 
credit (87/102/EEC) amended again mainly the calculation of annual percentage rate 
of charge72. Transposition into national law was made differently in each Member 
State and as result the level of harmonization remained low and also Member States 
reacted differently to new phenomena occurring during years which required 
regulation, so consumers as well as credit providers could not expect similar laws in 
other Member States which prevented cross-border activities (may it be taking credit 
or pursuing business abroad)73. 
 
The first Consumer Credit Directive was designed for financial services environment 
of 1980s, it could not stand new trends and technologies which appeared in the next 
20 years – more consumers were taking credit, absolute amount of money increased 
and common use of internet changed the process of taking credit (such as finding 
information online or distant conclusion of contract)74. After several years of 
discussions (commencing 2002 with European Commission Proposal75 continuing 
with amended proposal in 200476 and modified proposal in 200577). Final version of 
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the directive was adopted on 23 April 2008, entered into force 20 days after publication 
(that is 21 June 2008) and was to be transposed into national laws by 12 May 2010. 
 
Mortgage credit was (in fact still is) excluded from scope of consumer credit directives. 
The reason why it was exempted from the Consumer Credit Directive of 1987 was that 
national level of consumer protection was sufficient (i.e. the minimum standards set 
by CCD were fulfilled) and regulation on European level could not support common 
market aims. Later the main initiatives concerning mortgage credit were focused on 
pre-contractual information which shall support consumers when comparing offers 
from borrowers and also vice versa borrowers when assessing their local and also 
foreign competitors78. In 2001 Voluntary Code of Conduct for Pre-contractual 
Information for Home Loans (hereinafter also the ‘Code’) was adopted by 
Commission. By the time it became effective (i.e. 30 September 2002) already 3600 
institutions signed it up79. The Code was non-binding and was accepted in form of 
agreement, furthermore there were shortcomings due to missing compliance check 
mechanisms. However European Standardised Information Sheet (ESIS) which played 
the main role in pre-contractual information duties in the Code became later part of the 
new Mortgage Credit Directive.80  
 
Commission released White Paper of 18 December 2007 on the Integration of EU 
Mortgage Credit Markets presented by the Commission81. The White Paper outlined 
several objectives which could be summarized as bringing more diversity and options 
in house loans and consequential strengthening of consumers’ confidence. The 
objectives shall be achieved mainly by creating real common market and strengthening 
the competition among borrowers. The White Paper was published 6 years before 
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Commission adopted the final piece of legislation – Mortgage Credit Directive 
(MCD)82. 
 
2.2 Consumer Credit Directive and Mortgage Credit Directive 
As the history and background of CCD and MCD were briefly outlined we shall move 
on to evaluation of certain areas of the legislation. Content of the directives can be 
divided into several groups: scope, pre-contractual information and advertising, 
information concerning credit agreements, rights concerning credit agreements, annual 
percentage rate of charge, creditors and credit intermediaries, dispute resolution, 
creditworthiness assessment and advisory services. 
 
2.2.1 Scope 
CCD shall apply generally to credit agreements with certain exceptions – mortgage 
credit agreements, credit agreements to acquire right in land or building, credits with 
total amount of credit less than 200 EUR or more than 75 000 EUR, leasing agreements 
without obligation to purchase the object, overdraft facilities (typically credit cards), 
credits with no charges or credits with lower than average charges provided by 
employer, credit agreements with consumer’s liability limited to security deposited to 
creditor, deferred payments granted free of charge and then some special cases.  
 
The exceptions related to mortgage credit and credit to acquire right in land or building 
left space for Mortgage Credit Directive and special regulation introduced by it. It is 
quite questionable for the author why such credit agreements were exempted from the 
application of the directive when MCD requires even more advanced protection of the 
consumer. High importance of mortgage credit for consumers was emphasized in the 
past so the author would find it reasonable to include mortgage credit into newly 
introduced directive at least until mortgage credit legislation was released and became 
effective. Exemption of credits lower than 200 EUR and higher than 75 000 EUR 
raises some concerns too. Firstly, laying down absolute amount of money causes 
                                                          
82 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit 
agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 
2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 
36 
 
inequality among Member States and their citizens. While in rich Member State with 
high average salaries credit of 200 EUR does not affect an average consumer as much 
as it does affect an average consumer with significantly lower salary in less rich 
Member State. Prescribing absolute numbers is standard in European legislation and 
also in national legislations but it does not justify the inequality in provided protection. 
Setting fair thresholds for CCD application can be quite complicated but the author 
suggests leaving some discretion to Member State to choose the decisive amount of 
money themselves. The directive can on the other hand provide binding mechanism 
for setting it, e.g. based on average salary, average amount of money being borrowed 
etc. Of course, the creditors wishing to offer credits in different Member States would 
have to check the threshold in the respective Member State which may hinder the 
objective of common market but according to the author it is more important to protect 
the consumer than the creditor. Exemption of micro credits themselves (without 
defining them precisely) deems the author legitimate as compliance with CCD 
provision might cause additional charges and prevent parties to enter into credit 
agreement. The threshold for microcredits though must be set in compliance with real 
economic situation of consumers and specifics of the relevant market as was 
mentioned above. In relation with the exception in Article 2 (2) (j), CCD, which states 
that credit agreements which relate to the deferred payment, free of charge, of an 
existing debt are outside of the scope of the directive, we shall mention a recent ECJ 
decision83. It was ruled that deferred payment of existing debt is not made free of 
charge when the consumer is required to pay interests and costs which were not 
originally part of the credit agreement (but incurred because the consumer was due 
with payment). Deferred payment and rescheduling were offered by a debt collection 
agency acting on behalf of creditor.  
 
Mortgage Credit Directive shall apply to credit agreements which are secured either 
by a mortgage or by another comparable security commonly used in a Member State 
on residential immovable property or secured by a right related to residential 
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immovable property84 and also to credit agreements the purpose of which is to acquire 
or retain property rights in land or in an existing or projected building85. The Directive 
shall not apply to similar scenarios as CCD (e.g. employee credit, overdraft facility, 
credits with no or limited charges) and also to two specific cases - where the credit is 
provided in exchange for share of sale price of the pledged property (mainly 
investment cases); and where the repayment depends on fulfilment of condition (event 
which occurs in consumer’s life) defined by the Member State unless the consumer 
breaches the contract. The author sees some potential issues in the scope of the 
directive which are stemming from the diversity and specifics of each Member State’s 
market with housing loans. Housing loans are often subject to national politics and are 
likely to be influenced by state’s interventions which can even lead to very specific 
financial products. It might therefore be complicated to define accurately the 
conditions for MCD application. The Member States can include their own specific 
case into transposing law, on the other hand they may not. Either cause uncertainty for 
credit providers and therefore obstruct common market. 
 
2.2.2 Pre-contractual information and advertising 
Advertising 
Consumer Credit Directive requires that Article 4, related to advertising, shall apply 
only to cases when the advertised credit agreements are presented with indication of 
cost of the credit or interest rate. In this case the advertisement shall contain 
information in form of representative example about total cost of credit, total amount 
of credit, annual percentage rate of charge (except of credits provided as overdraft 
facility) and, if applicable, duration of the credit agreement, total amount payable and 
the number of instalments, for credits related to purchase of certain service or goods 
(deferred payments) cash price and the amount of any advance payment. If the 
consumer must enter into ancillary service contract (mainly insurance), the obligation 
must be stated too. The information above need to be provided in clear, concise and 
prominent way and means of representative example shall serve to this purpose. 
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Mortgage Credit Directive follows the requirements introduced in the CCD – scope of 
application is identic, information must be again provided in clear, concise and 
prominent way by means of a representative example (under MCD also easily legible 
and clearly audible) and the same kind of information must be provided except of those 
naturally inapplicable for mortgage credit, that is the information related to credit 
agreements concluded for purposes of goods or services supply, information about 
compulsory ancillary service. In addition, pursuant to MCD the advertisement shall 
include also identification of the creditor (or credit intermediary), the information 
whether mortgage security is needed and where applicable warning about possible 
change of exchange rate for credit agreements affected by currency rates.  
 
Interesting question arises with the term ‘by means of representative example’ – while 
CCD does not provide any specification at what it is, MCD instructs Member States 
to adopt criteria for determining it86. For example, the UK legislation foresees that 
representative shall mean an example of agreement which would be concluded based 
on the advertisement and advertised APRC shall be charged to majority of the 
customers87. The author thinks that it is highly important to abide with the purpose of 
representative example (and therefore define them in legislation) such as case study of 
typical customer for certain product and not a perfect one as such may lead to very 
misleading statements albeit still compliant with law. Another interesting problem is 
caused by the narrow scope of application of advertising rules. The thought behind its 
narrow construction is probably, beside leaving space for national legislation88, to 
avoid excessive burden for commercials if all the information would need to be 
published in all cases. On the other hand, these uneven requirements lead to 
advertisements which do not indicate interest rate or total cost of credit and rather 
promote the credit offers in different way89. It can be subject to discussion whether 
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advertisements which make impression that borrowing money is easy and safe of any 
risks and which encourages irresponsible lending, shall be regulated or not. 
 
Pre-contractual information 
Pre-contractual information shall serve as first mean to warn consumer before entering 
into contract and to provide data for thorough comparison of different offers. 
Consumer Credit Directive distinguish between credit agreements and credit 
agreements in the form of overdraft facility. Information to be provided in the latter 
case is adapted to the specific nature of the service. Both categories have though most 
of the obligation in common. The information shall be provided in good time before 
the consumer is obliged to any performance and shall be provided on durable medium 
by means of Standard European Consumer Credit Information form which is enclosed 
in Annex II to the directive. There are five categories of information to be provided 
according to Article 5, CCD – identity and contact details of the creditor/credit 
intermediary, description of the main features of the credit product, costs of the credit, 
other important legal aspects and additional information in the case of distance 
marketing of financial services. 
 
For purposes of this work it is rather pointless to elaborate all the information into 
detail. We shall focus on the potency of pre-contractual information to help consumers. 
The initial idea is that informed consumers can best decide what contract they want to 
enter into. It also strengthens the principle of autonomy of will and preserves the free 
market without restrictions. What is more, it is easier to find compromise for full 
harmonization information rules than for other protective measures90. The consumer 
can make free decision based on their preferences may it be low costs, possibility of 
early repayment or absence of security. Creditors on the other hand cannot conceal 
certain information so easily and their previous misleading advertisement or behaviour 
would be confronted with clear information provided in the form. All these advantages 
are based on the assumption that the consumer reads and understands the provided 
information. Both shall be supported by legibility of the form and its standardization 
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(laying down same forms with different offers enables less complicated comparison). 
The consumer must know however meaning of used terms and their consequences. It 
is hardly imaginable to draft legislation which would secure consumer’s full 
understanding or full protection while preserving free contracting. 
 
Above mentioned views apply for dealings face to face with enough time to 
contemplate the offer. For cases of distant marketing requested by the consumer, the 
consumer shall obtain full pre-contractual information immediately after concluding 
the contract91. In addition, when concluding credit agreement in telephone 
communication the consumer shall be informed already during the communication 
about the total amount of credit and conditions for drawdown, duration of the credit 
agreement, good or service and its cash price for credits in form of deferred payments, 
information about borrowing rate and payments. Providing these categories of 
information is only logical as the consumers can hardly take in and contemplate more 
than main features of the credit unless they are experts in certain fields. Obligation to 
provide customer with certain facts does not hinder the possibility to provide also other 
information or for the consumer to ask for them.  
 
Mortgage Credit Directive also enumerates in Article 13 what information must be 
exactly provided to the consumer at all times on durable medium. Following the 
categorization of the pre-contractual information set in ESIS (in Annex II) we can 
divide them into these groups: information about the lender and where applicable also 
about the credit intermediary, main features of the loan, interest rate and other costs, 
frequency and number of payments, amount of each instalment, where applicable 
illustrative repayment table, additional obligations, possibility of early repayment, 
flexible features, other rights of the borrower, complaints, non-compliance with the 
commitments linked to the loan: consequences for the borrower, additional 
information where applicable and information about supervising authority. The 
amount of information is huge, completed ESIS would be several pages long. An 
ordinary consumer may have problems to distinguish between essential and less 
important features of the loan, taking into account the individuality of each case. 
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Financial literacy plays therefore important role in the helpfulness of such extensive 
amount of information. 
 
Furthermore, MCD requires in Article 14 credit intermediaries to provide, upon 
information given by the customer about his or her financial needs and situation, 
personalised pre-contractual information which must be in any case in form of ESIS 
which is set out in Annex II and can serve to comparison of credit offers. The pre-
contractual information shall be given on durable medium and before the consumer is 
bound by any credit agreement or offer. However, Member States have certain 
discretion with limits set in MCD regarding reflection period. Reflection period must 
be at least 7 days long and can be either constructed as period during which consumer 
can withdraw the contract or the consumer can accept the offer which must be in any 
case binding on the side of the offeror.  
 
Quite controversial in the author’s opinion is the provision92 enabling Member States 
to introduce legislation forbidding acceptation of the offer for up to 10 days. Pre-
contractual information shall serve as an instrument for making informed decision for 
consumers as they can easily compare offers. Reflection period strengthens the 
purpose of pre-contractual information by leaving enough time for consumers to 
contemplate. None of these instruments interfere with consumers’ autonomy of will as 
ban of accepting offer before cooling-off period has elapsed. The consumer can have 
very good reasons why to accept an offer without waiting several days. E.g.- time 
pressure not to miss profitable deal etc. On the other hand, it is possible that creditors 
and credit intermediaries would find a way how to make consumers decide fast and 
under pressure (e.g. discounts or additional services free of charge when entering into 
the contract before certain date).  
 
To conclude the topic of pre-contractual information, we shall examine a popular trick 
made by creditors which lies basically in reversing the burden of proof by letting 
consumers sign a clause stating that the consumer acknowledges that he or she 
                                                          




obtained all required information. This practice was subject to ECJ ruling93 where the 
court found that reversal of burden of proof is not compliant with Articles 5 and 8, 
CCD, because consumer is not able to prove that he or she did not receive sufficient 
pre-contractual information. Such constellation would undermine the consumer rights 
conferred by CCD. The author shares the opinion and reasons laid in the judgment as 
enabling such a simple reversal of burden of proof would completely circumvent the 
objective of the legislation, i.e. strengthening the position of consumers. 
 
2.2.3 Information concerning credit agreements 
While pre-contractual information aims to provide complete information for the 
consumer to make an informed decision, information concerning credit agreements 
serve, beside information function, for interpreting the credit agreement and for case 
of dispute. Consumer Credit Directive contains in Article 10 extensive enumerative 
list of information to be included in credit agreement. Those are basic information 
about the contract and credit, costs and charges related to it, payment information, 
specifics for credit agreements with capital amortization, additional services costs and 
rights linked to it, consequences of late payment, whether sureties or insurance are 
required, right of withdrawal (if existent), information about early repayment, contract 
termination procedure. Credit agreements in form of overdraft facility are regulated 
also by some special provisions as we have seen by pre-contractual information. 
According to Article 11, CCD the consumer shall be informed about changes in the 
borrowing rate before such changes are effective, however it might be stipulated 
between the parties that such change is only to be announced publicly if it is subject to 
periodical changes in reference rate which is base for the borrowing rate. 
 
Mortgage Credit Directive does not regulate the content of mortgage credit agreements 
in terms of information. It only instructs that changes in the borrowing rate shall be 
announced94, the rules are very similar to those in CCD.  
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In respect of information to be contained in credit agreements, we must not omit to 
mention ECJ decision95 where the court stated that the information does not need to be 
contained in a single document so that a cross-reference in credit agreement to another 
document (which is also provided to the consumer in form of paper or another durable 
medium) is sufficient. The court emphasizes the condition that the information must 
be written in clear and concise manner in order to ensure customer’s full 
comprehension with his/her rights and obligations. Furthermore, it is left for national 
law to provide that all documents bearing the necessary contract information must be 
signed96. In the same case it was also ruled that: ‘a credit agreement need not indicate 
the specific date on which every payment to be made by the consumer falls due, 
provided that the terms of the agreement allow the consumer to ascertain the dates of 
those payments without difficulty and with certainty.97’ On the other hand Member 
States must not impose obligation which requires amortization table in a credit 
agreement to state the proportion of each instalment used for repayment of the 
capital98. The reason for this restriction may be, according to the author, the goal to 
ensure same level of harmonization throughout the EU. However, the author holds that 
such an obligation, imposed already under the CCD, would be beneficial in terms of 
certainty, clarity and dispute resolution. To conclude, the court ruled that penalties for 
not including all the required information into the contract must be proportionate so 
that the penalty of credit being interest and charge free cannot stand the requirement 
of proportionality when the breach of the information obligation does not cause 
consumer’s unawareness of his or her obligations under the agreement99. In this case 
omitting to include annual percentage rate of charge, number and frequency of 
payments etc. in the contractual information is deemed to be such a severe breach of 
law that Member States can impose the penalty of interest-free and cost-free credit100. 
The author shares this position towards penalties. 
 
                                                          
95 Judgment of 9 November 2016, C-42/15, EU:C:2016:842, para.. 30, 31, 33, 34, 45 
96 Ibid., paragraph 45. 
97 Ibid., paragraph 50. 
98 Ibid., paragraphs 55-59. 
99 Ibid., paragraphs 62 and 72. 
100 Ibid., paragraph 70, 71 and 73. 
44 
 
2.2.4 Rights concerning credit agreements 
Consumer Credit Directive in Chapter IV regulates expressively, beside contractual 
information and information about borrowing rate, obligations related to credits in 
form of overdraft facility and overrunning, open-end credit agreements, rights of 
withdrawal, linked credit agreements, early repayment and assignment of rights.  
 
Obligations in connection with credit agreement in form of overdraft facility concern 
information duty which is similar to the contractual information obligations for other 
types of credits. Credit in form of overrunning (overrunning is an agreed or tacitly 
accepted overdraft101) is linked also to information duty with lesser extent (information 
about overrunning, amount involved, borrowing rate and penalties, charges or interest 
on arrears). 
 
Special rights concerning open-end credit agreements cover termination of the 
contract. The consumer can terminate the contract free of charge at any time, notice 
period applies when stipulated in the contract but must not exceed one month. On the 
contrary the creditor can terminate the contract only if agreed in the credit agreement 
(with termination notice on paper or on another durable medium) and the notice period 
must be at least two months long. The above mentioned rules apply to standard 
termination, CCD covers also cases of termination of the right to draw down from the 
open-end credit. This can be pursued only if agreed in the credit agreement and under 
objective reasons, the consumer must be informed before or right after the termination 
unless such information notice is not compliant with Member State’s law or public 
policy or security (typically crime prevention or investigation).  
 
Right to withdraw from the credit agreement 
Withdrawal right is one of the strongest instrument for consumer and as such it was 
construed under CCD to leave little discretion power to Member States to adopt their 
own rules.  
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The default setting, contained in Article 14 (1), CCD, is 14 days period during which 
the consumer can contemplate the credit agreement and withdraw from it. The period 
begins either with conclusion of the contract or in the moment when the consumer 
receives full contractual information depending on which date comes later. Paragraph 
2 contains exception for linked credit agreements where Member States already before 
CCD had become effective adopted legislation prohibiting immediate disposal of 
linked credit but after specific period. In that case Member States can adopt 
exceptionally legislation allowing to reduce the withdrawal right period to the specific 
period but only upon explicit request of the consumer. According to the author such 
setting can be problematic as what shall be understood under explicit request – clause 
contained in general terms and conditions or separate annex to the agreement stating 
for example: ‘hereby I pronounce that I explicitly requested that I reduce the period 
during which I am entitled to withdraw from the credit agreement.’ Or is a completely 
separate request needed? Even if we ignore this issue, question of profitability for the 
consumer arises. This provision favors creditors and relies on the fact that the 
consumer already had enough time to withdraw from the contract. As we already 
discussed above, the whole concept of postponed availability of the credit is at least 
complicated.  
 
The obligations linked to the execution of the right to withdraw are outlined in Article 
14 (3), CCD. Firstly, the consumer must notify the creditor of withdrawing from the 
contract, the period is deemed preserved also by dispatching the notification before the 
deadline expires. The notification shall be made in such way that it can be proven 
according to national law. These requirements are standard in consumer protection 
law. Secondly, the consumer is obliged to repay the capital and the accrued interest 
calculated according to borrowing rate for the number of days elapsed between the 
repayment and dispatch of withdrawal notice. The creditor is entitled solely to the 
compensation of non-returnable charges paid to any public administrative body. The 
author regards this provision to be well-founded as it preserves balance between rights 
of both creditor and consumer. A consumer who is obliged to pay interest according 
to borrowing rate and payments made to public administrative bodies cannot misuse 
taking credit free of charge. Creditor cannot make profit on high charges related to 
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administration of the credit. Article 14 (4) CCD also prescribes that withdrawal from 
credit agreement is also always applied to ancillary services. 
 
Similar scenario concerns linked credit agreements – if the consumer exercises his or 
her right which is guaranteed under Community law to withdraw from a contract for 
the supply of goods or services, credit agreements to fund such contracts are ineffective 
as well. This provision is, according to the author, reasonable because it would hamper 
consumer protection if he or she is guaranteed withdrawal right (for the contract for 
supply of goods or services) but exercising it would mean he or she has an extra credit 
which is now of no use. On the other hand, provision of Article 15 (2), CCD might be 
controversial stating that creditor can be held liable if the supplier breaches his or her 
duties related to the supply of goods or services and the consumer pursued remedies 
against him unsuccessfully. The extent and conditions for remedies against creditor 
shall be determined by Member States. The author sees the most significant issue in 
the fact that one person is held liable for breaches of contract without being contracting 
party. The creditor cannot fully affect supplier’s behaviour so he or she shall not be 
made responsible for supplier’s actions. Furthermore, the creditor is not professional 
in the area of the to be supplied goods or services and therefore might not possess 
enough expertise to assess the alleged breaches and claimed remedies. Finally, the 
creditor is not able to provide remedies without cooperation with the supplier or if 
necessary the creditor needs to engage substitute supplier. On contrary, the reason for 
the discussed rule is to make creditors consider with whom they cooperate (to 
cooperate only with reliable suppliers). Secondly, the creditors have more power over 
the suppliers than consumers to make them fulfil their obligations from the supply 
contract. Additionally, consumers might trust a certain supplier because of his 
cooperation with renown credit provider. As there are pros and contras for creditor’s 
liability it is essential to assess national law for the details – the extent of creditor’s 
liability can provide important element of consumer protection or can bring significant 





Right of early repayment surely belongs to the most important consumer rights in CCD 
as well as MCD. This right enables consumers to fully discharge their obligations 
under credit agreement and thereby cut the costs of the credit as they shall be cut off 
interest rate and the costs for the remaining duration of the credit. Both directives 
guarantee the right and some of its essential aspects but also protect the creditor from 
unjustified losses and abuse of rights from the side of the consumers.  
 
CCD contains in Article 16 quite concrete rules for early repayment. For example, the 
creditor can seek compensation for costs arisen from the early repayment. However, 
such compensation is limited to 1% of the amount of credit repaid early when the 
repayment takes place more than one year before the termination date according to the 
credit agreement, for early repayment taking place less than one year before due date, 
the limit is 0,5% of the early repaid amount. The compensation shall not be claimed in 
the case that the early repayment is covered by insurance, overdraft facilities and if 
‘the repayment falls within the period for which the borrowing rate is not fixed.’ 
Member States can adopt their own rules regarding compensation limits. However, the 
compensation must not be higher than the interest the consumer would have paid if the 
early repayment had not taken place. 
 
In the author’s opinion, these rules guarantee the essence of the early repayment 
advantage for consumers. Making the credit more expensive when repaying before the 
due date used to be common practice for creditors and it used to be their way to secure 
certain level of profit, however it made the consumers unable to unbind themselves 
from useless credit and made them less flexible when coping with their finance, 
therefore are the provisions very beneficial for consumers. There remains a risk that 
Member States can prescribe different (higher) compensation limits and paralyze the 
provisions of CCD. 
 
MCD (Article 25) is on contrary less prescriptive than CCD. According to recital 66, 
MCD the mortgage credit market is very heterogenous throughout the EU which is 
why a large space for Member States’ discretion was procured. Firstly, Member States 
must adopt legislation which secures early repayment rights to consumers. Secondly, 
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it is left to Member States to introduce special conditions for early repayment, MCD 
foresees e.g. limitations as to time and circumstances of execution, justified 
compensation (never a sanction) up to the amount of financial losses incurred. Member 
States can also restrict early repayment in times for which borrowing rate is fixed only 
for cases of consumer’s legitimate interest, such legitimate interest may be divorce or 
unemployment according to Recital 66, MCD. Finally, MCD contains also general 
obligation for the creditors to provide sufficient information (e.g. implications for the 
consumer and used assumptions) regarding the early repayment to the consumer. 
 
Assignment of rights 
If the creditor assigns rights from the credit agreement to a third party, the consumer’s 
defences against the creditor shall be applicable also against the assignee, including 
set-off if possible under national law. The consumer has also right to be informed about 
the assignment unless the creditor continues to service the contract.  
 
These rights for consumers do not guarantee necessarily anything new for the 
consumers as such rules often apply in civil law across the EU, e.g. in German civil 
law the debtor (in our case the consumer) need to be informed about the assignment 
and can apply his or her defences which he or she would have had against the original 
creditor in the moment of assignment102. Similar legal regulations are applied in 
Austria103 and the Czech Republic104. As redundant as this provision might seem, it 
does not do any harm and can contribute to ensuring higher level of harmonisation and 
level playing field across the EU. 
 
2.2.5 Annual percentage rate of charge 
We will briefly discuss the regulation of Annual percentage rate of charge (APRC) in 
Consumer Credit Directive and Mortgage Credit Directive in order not to skip an 
important topic, however its core issues arise mostly from mathematical aspects rather 
than legal. Related provisions have never been disputed as to the formula.  
 
                                                          
102 Germany. Act of 18 August 1896 Civil Code, as amended, sections 402 and 404 respectively. 
103 Austria. Act No. 946/1811 Federal Law Gazette, General Civil Code, as amended, section 1386. 
104 Czech Republic. Act No. 89/2012 Coll., Civil Code, as amended, section 1884 (1). 
49 
 
APRC can serve as an essential mean to compare credit offers because it represents 
one of the key factors in customer’s decision making – the price. It is also easy to 
compare APRC among several offers. These considerations105 led to unification of 
APRC mathematical formula and its anchoring in CCD and MCD. Article 19, CCD 
contains the most important assumptions which regulate the input data for APRC. 
Additional assumptions are set out in Part II of Annex I, they shall be applied if 
necessary. Shall the assumptions not suffice to calculate the APRC or shall they be 
outdated, Commission is entitled to adopt additional assumptions enabling the correct 
calculation of APRC. Article 17 and Part II of the Annex I, MCD contains similar 
assumptions and their application rules to CCD but the assumptions are tailored for 
the specifics of mortgage credits. 
 
2.2.6 Creditors and credit intermediaries 
CCD regulates creditors and credit intermediaries differently, but neither of them is 
extensively regulated. The control of creditors is entrusted to the Member States and 
their national law under the condition, that the creditors are ‘supervised by a body or 
authority independent from financial institutions. This shall be without prejudice to 
Directive 2006/48/EC.’106 Even though the directive shall not be applied to all 
creditors in the sense of CCD, large number of them are regulated by the Directive 
2006/48/EC (namely those creditors who are institutions receiving deposits from the 
public and granting credit for its own account107). The requirements imposed upon 
credit institutions are mostly concerning capital requirements, risk management, 
leading personnel, process of authorization etc. However, direct impact on consumer 
credit is not captured in the directive. In the author’s opinion, the minimum (or rather 
zero) level of harmonization is corresponding with other areas of regulation contained 
in CCD. Furthermore, Member States usually allow only the institutions regulated 
                                                          
105 Rec. 43, CCD. 
106 Article 20, CDD. 
107 Article 4 (1) (a), Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 
2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast), which was 
repealed by Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 





under the Directive 2006/48/EC to provide credit, the conditions remain similar in 
major EU countries108. 
 
Regarding credit intermediaries CCD leaves it to Member States to adopt legislation 
ensuring that credit intermediaries disclose fees payable by the consumer for the 
services of credit intermediary both to the consumer (in that case the information must 
be on a durable medium) and the creditor (to be able to include it in the APRC). The 
credit intermediary must also disclose his or her relation to creditors, whether he or 
she is independent broker or exclusive representative of some creditors. 
 
Mortgage Credit Directive in Chapter 11 contains more detailed provisions on credit 
intermediaries and appointed representatives. Provision of Article 29, MCD regulates 
the admission of credit intermediaries – credit intermediaries shall always need to be 
registered and allowed to provide services by the competent authority of their home 
Member State109. In order to be admitted, credit intermediaries need to meet certain 
requirements and fulfil them on ongoing basis110. These requirements include 
indemnity insurance or similar guarantee against liability arising from professional 
negligence (Commission can adopt based on EBA’s draft regulatory technical 
standards), good repute of the credit intermediary if natural person, if legal person then 
good repute of its leading personnel (good repute means particularly being subject to 
no police record related to financial activities or against property and not being 
declared bankrupt) and requirements concerning knowledge of and competency in 
credit agreements. Professional knowledge is further elaborated in Annex III, which 
contains categories of knowledge and competency forming the minimum level and 
also suggests to Member States dividing the knowledge and competence to 
qualification and experience and also introducing different requirements for creditors, 
credit intermediaries and appointed representatives. 
 
                                                          
108 VANDONE, Daniela. Consumer credit in Europe risks and opportunities of a dynamic industry. 
Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2009. P.118. ISBN 37-908-2101-2.  
109 Article 29 (1), MCD. 




Credit intermediaries under MCD shall be registered in national registers which must 
be up to date and online111. The information to be entered into the register concern 
persons responsible for intermediation (managers and upon Member State’s discretion 
also client-facing staff), information about the basis for providing services in the 
Member State (freedom of establishment or freedom to provide services) and 
information whether the credit intermediary is tied or not (if he or she is tied, name of 
the tying creditor, alternatively of tying credit intermediary in case of appointed 
representative). MCD also set requirements for headquarters and registered address of 
the credit intermediaries112, the aim of this provision is to prevent credit intermediaries 
to register in the Member State with most favourable legislation. Member States shall 
establish single information point for easy access to national registers. 
 
Provisions of Articles 30 and 31, MCD enable Member States to adopt legislation 
facilitating less strict rules for credit intermediaries tied only to one creditor and for 
appointed representatives. Credit intermediaries tied to only one creditor may be 
admitted through the creditor provided that the creditor is liable for the conduct of the 
intermediary and monitor his or her compliance with requirements concerning 
indemnity insurance, good repute and professional knowledge and competence. 
Appointed representatives, i.e. a person performing activities analogous to ones of 
credit intermediary on behalf of and under responsibility of one credit intermediary, 
are subject to similar rules as tied credit intermediaries, the responsible person in their 
case is the credit intermediary who appointed them, unless he or she is tied to one 
creditor, then it is the creditor. Appointed representatives need to be enlisted with the 
appointing credit intermediary in the register. 
 
Cross-border activities of credit intermediaries are anticipated by Article 32, MCD. 
Credit intermediaries admitted in one Member States can provide services in another 
Member States based on the admission in the home Member State. Credit 
intermediaries willing to provide services in another Member States for the first time 
must notify its home regulating authority, which then notify the regulating authority 
                                                          
111 Article 29 (4). MCD. 
112 Article 29 (5), MCD. 
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in the Member State concerned in order to allow it to enter necessary information into 
the register in the concerned Member State. This shall happen within one-month time 
so that credit intermediary may start the business one month after notifying its 
regulating authority. It needs to be said that freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services cannot serve to circumvent national law prohibiting appointed 
representatives (i.e. they cannot be active in Member States which do not allow them 
to operate) and non-credit institutions to operate (i.e. credit intermediaries cannot offer 
credits provided by non-credit institution). Consumer Credit Directive does not 
expressively regulate cross-border activities and passporting which is impractical and 
confusing given the quite elaborate rules in MCD. 
 
MCD in its Article 33 anticipates also the possibility to withdraw from admission in 
cases of renouncement, inactivity, admission based on false or misleading statements, 
missing fulfilment of the requirements, infringement with MCD provisions and also in 
cases foreseen by national law. Home regulating authorities shall erase the credit 
intermediary from its register and also notify authorities in other Member States, where 
the credit intermediary carried out services based on freedom of establishment and 
freedom to provide services.  
 
We shall also briefly outline supervision of credit intermediaries and appointed 
representatives as provided in Article 34, MCD. It is the responsibility of the home 
Member States to secure primary supervision of the credit intermediaries as well as 
appointed representatives. Host Member States (i.e. where credit intermediary has its 
branch) are competent to pursue supervision of compliance with MCD provisions 
affecting consumers. Firstly, when detecting breach of MCD the competent authorities 
in the host Member State need to request remedies from the credit intermediary in 
breach. If the credit intermediary does not take the necessary action, the host Member 
State can take action to fix the situation but must inform the home Member State about 
the action taken, which can, in case of dissent, seek assistance with EBA. In matter 
different from those directly impeding consumers, host Member State shall first notify 
the competent authorities for the home Member States which shall take appropriate 
action. If it fails to fix the problem within one month, the host Member State can take 
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all appropriate action necessary to protect consumers or seek assistance with EBA. 
The author finds these provisions very reasonable as the host Member States can take 
action only in cases where consumers’ interests are threatened while they shall not 
interfere in cases where consumers are not directly involved so that they do not meddle 
in areas of regulation which shall be responsibility of home Member State. It is 
difficult to find balance between the interest of the home and host Member States as 
home Member States might be reluctant to take appropriate action when it is needed 
(albeit obliged to cooperate according to Article 36, MCD) while host Member States 
might tend to restrain credit intermediaries from other Member States to carry on 
business in their territory and effectively hinder common market and cross-border 
activity.  
 
To conclude, we need to mention ECJ decision113 declaring, that ‘…a debt collection 
agency which concludes, on behalf of a lender, a rescheduling agreement for an 
unpaid credit, but which acts as a credit intermediary only in an ancillary capacity, 
which is for the referring court to determine, must be regarded as being a ‘credit 
intermediary’ within the meaning of Article 3(f)…’ 
 
2.6.7 Dispute resolution 
CCD in Article 21 promotes, in correspondence with current tendencies, out-of-court 
dispute resolution. National law shall enable effective alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms while using existing bodies which shall cooperate in cases of cross-border 
dispute to resolve quickly. Nearly identical provision is to be found in Article 39, 
MCD. Out-of-court dispute resolution shall be beneficial for the consumer114 as it is 
less formalistic, costly and complicated, mainly in case of cross-border disputes.115 
FIN-NET, a network of national organisations responsible for settling consumers' 
complaints in the area of financial services out of court, stated in its report116 that in 
                                                          
113 Judgment of 8 December 2016, C‑127/15, EU:C:2016:934, para. 53. 
114 Recital 77, MCD suggests so by encouraging Member States to adopt rules which ensures the choice 
of dispute resolution depends on the consumer and creditors or credit intermediaries cannot avoid 
alternative dispute resolution when consumer chooses it. 
115 VANDONE Ref. 108. P.123. 
116 European Commission, Directorate General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital 




2016 its members handled 2571 cross-border disputes, 1202 from banking sector and 
592 from insurance sector, which is less than the total number of handled cases in the 
previous years (being 4195 in 2015, 3514 in 2014) while the numbers for banking 
sector remained similar averaging between 1200-1300)117. Quite interestingly, the 
numbers do not rise, even though consumers tend to be more self-assured, less worried 
to solve their dispute and despite the aims to strengthen common market in the EU. 
 
2.6.8 Creditworthiness assessment 
Creditworthiness assessment is one of the central goals of Mortgage Credit Directive 
as reaction to real estate bubble, consequential Global Economic Crisis of 2008 and 
one of its causes – irresponsible behaviour of market participants118. Creditworthiness 
assessment shall be the tool to prevent granting credit based on the current value of the 
property and speculative value in the future or based on the difference between the 
amount of mortgage credit and the value of the property (i.e. lump sum paid by the 
lender not from the mortgage).119 Certain exception is preserved for mortgage credit 
granted for property renovation.120 Instead, the decisive factor shall be the ability of 
the lender to repay the mortgage credit based on his or her circumstances.121  
 
Pursuant to Recital 55, MCD ‘all necessary and relevant factors that could influence 
a consumer’s ability to repay the credit’ shall be considered. That means also 
fluctuation of consumer’s income during his or her life or inclusion of income from 
renting out the property in cases of buy-to-let agreements122. Creditors shall respect 
the outcome of creditworthiness assessment – if it turns out that the consumer will be 
unable to meet his or her obligations under the credit agreement, the mortgage credit 
shall not be granted. On the other hand, even positive result of creditworthiness 
                                                          
117 European Commission, Directorate General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital 
Markets Union. FIN-NET Activity Report 2015. Brussels, October 2016. P.5. 
118 Recital 4, MCD. 
119 DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE, Pierre. The Directive on the Credit Agreements for Consumers 
relating to Residential Immovable Property (Directive 2014/17): a Regulatory Explanation and a 
Private Law Analysis. European Business Law Review. 2016. ISSN 0959-6941. P.43 
120 Article 18 (3), MCD. 
121 HAENTJENS, Matthias and DE GIOIA-CARABELLESE, Pierre. European Banking and Financial 
Law. Oxford: Routledge, 2015. P.72-73. ISBN 1317483073.  




assessment does not oblige the creditor to enter into contract with the consumer.123 
Once the creditor concludes credit agreement with the consumer, the creditor cannot 
withdraw from the agreement, terminate or alter it because of incorrectly conducted 
creditworthiness assessment, unless the consumer provides false information (but this 
must be also stated by national law)124. This shall be without prejudice to private 
contract law.125 How shall we interpret the provision? There are several possibilities 
for private contract law to allow termination or alteration of contract may it be due to 
error, change in circumstances, etc. The author would suggest that the creditor must 
not bespeak in the credit agreement that the contract is invalid or that it is possible to 
terminate it if the creditworthiness assessment was conducted incorrectly. However, if 
the incorrectness was so significant or the circumstances of the case would provide 
base for withdrawal, termination or alternation according to national private contract 
law, MCD would not hamper the creditor to use it.  
 
Credit databases are another big topic for creditworthiness assessment – creditors can 
consult databases for purposes of creditworthiness assessment and default risk 
analysis, but they must not abuse them in commercial negotiations126. The consumer 
must be also informed that database is to be consulted and when the credit is not 
granted based on that consultation127.  
 
Property valuation is essential part of creditworthiness assessment and also of the 
whole process of credit agreement conclusion. MCD foresees that property valuation 
standards shall be available in Member States and are based on reliable international 
standards developed by one of the specified committees128. Creditors need to adhere 
to the standards or ensure that third party independent appraisers are compliant with 
them, unless these are regulated and monitored by Member States129. Both external 
and internal appraisers must be professionally competent and sufficiently independent 
                                                          
123 Recital 57, MCD. 
124 Article 18 (4), MCD. 
125 Recital 58, MCD. 
126 Recital 59, MCD. 
127 Article 18 (5) (b) (c), MCD. 
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for the credit underwriting process so that their valuation is fair. It must be also 
recorded on durable medium kept by the creditor130. 
 
Consumer information necessary to conduct creditworthiness assessment shall be 
obtained from various sources, both internal and external, including consumer and his 
information disclosure to credit intermediaries. The information shall be verified 
accordingly.131 Creditors shall specify to the consumers at the pre-contractual phase 
what information and what evidence to support it shall be submitted and at what point.  
No more information than actually needed can be required.132 Creditors shall use 
various data regarding consumer’s monetary situation – income (expected significant 
future increase of income shall not be relied to unless sufficient evidence is 
provided)133, obligations and non-discretionary expenditures134. Member States shall 
ensure that consumers are aware of the consequences of providing incorrect, 
incomplete or no information.135 
 
Consumer Credit Directive also contains basic rules on creditworthiness assessment in 
Article 8, however they are far less detailed than provisions of MCD, due to the lack 
of risk of credits granted because of expected increase in price of the property. 
However, responsible lending needs to be promoted and secured pursuant to Recital 
26, CCD. Risks similar to those in MCD can also arise in credits regulated by CCD, 
e.g. credits secured by a pledge which price is expected to increase significantly over 
the duration of the credit, but such cases are rather exceptional and cannot influence 
the market so significantly as happened with mortgage credit. CCD therefore only 
provides that creditworthiness of the consumer shall be assessed based on sufficient 
information, may they be given by the consumer or originate from database 
consultation. Database consultation can remain compulsory for creditors in Member 
States where the preceding legislation provided so. Shall the amount of credit increase 
                                                          
130 Article 19 (2), MCD. 
131 Article 20 (1), MCD. 
132 Article 20 (3), MCD. 
133 EBA. EBA guidelines on creditworthiness assessment: Final report on guidelines on 
creditworthiness assessment EBA/GL/2015/11 [online]. In: . 19. 8. 2015 [cit. 2018-04-02]. Guideline 4. 
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significantly after conclusion of the credit agreement, the creditor needs to reassess 
consumer’s creditworthiness. 
 
In connection with provisions of CCD on creditworthiness assessment, we shall not 
omit to mention ECJ decision136 where the court stated that if the creditor fails to 
conduct creditworthiness assessment, the sanctions for it shall be deterrent pursuant to 
Article 23, CCD. In the handled case, French law prevented the creditor from obtaining 
contractual interests but not statutory, which were paradoxically higher, therefore 
beneficial for the creditor who breached his obligations. ECJ ruled that Article 23, 
CCD shall forbid national law to impose sanctions which would not be deterring to the 
creditor as applying them would be advantageous for the creditor137. Another ECJ 
decision138 stated that reversing burden of proof for obligations of creditor regarding 
creditworthiness assessment is forbidden, so that the consumer must not be the one 
who proves that the creditworthiness assessment was not conducted. 
 
Creditworthiness assessment can also prevent consumers in their aims to obtain 
housing loan even though they will not be able to repay it. Consumers tend to regard 
real estate investments as secure despite of the market volatility, which is present 
especially outside of prime locations. It is complicated to prove if new requirements 
of creditworthiness assessment introduced in MCD contributed to drop in percent of 
defaulted mortgage credit. It depends on more factors such as central banks 
requirements on loan to value, phase of economic cycle, situation on local real estate 
markets etc. Next economic crises will show best if the real estate bubble known from 
the economic crises of 2008 will blow up again or not. At the moment, the author 
would say that the creditworthiness assessment is rather helpful for consumer 
protection even though it was not intended so at first. 
 
                                                          
136 Judgment of 27 March 2014, LCL Le Crédit Lyonnais SA v Fesih Kalhan, C‑565/12, 
EU:C:2014:190. 
137 Ibid., paragraph 55. 
138 Judgment of 18 December 2014, C-449/13, EU:C:2014:2464. 
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2.6.9 Advisory services 
The terms advice and advisors are, according to Recital 63, MCD, considered seriously 
by consumers in the sense that the best options for them are being offered to them. 
Therefore, Member States can regulate the usage of these terms, especially when 
proclaimed that the advice is independent. Mortgage Credit Directive in Chapter 8 
imposes to Member States to transpose in national legislation basic standards for 
advisory services. It needs to be noted that Consumer Credit Directive does not 
regulate advisory services. 
 
Firstly, the consumer must be explicitly informed if advisory services are being or can 
be provided139. Consumers shall be also provided with information similar to pre-
contractual information regarding recommendation, specifically the range of products 
in offer – credit intermediary’s own product range or whole market product range, and 
fee payable for advisory services140. In order to provide advisory services, credit 
intermediaries shall obtain all relevant information from the consumer to be able to 
assess all the consumer’s personal and financial circumstances to consider suitable 
credits and recommend one or more of them. The credit intermediary who is tied need 
to consider sufficient amount of offers of his or her product range and non-tied credit 
intermediary need to consider sufficient number of products on the market. As we 
often encounter in MCD and CCD, the provided recommendation shall be on durable 
medium. 141 Consumers shall be informed whether the recommended products reflect 
the whole market or only the products in the credit intermediary’s portfolio142. 
 
Secondly, as already mentioned above, Member States can regulate usage of terms 
advice and advisory services. They can even prohibit these words when the ‘advice’ 
shall be given by creditors, tied credit intermediaries or appointed representatives of 
them. If Member States adopt such strict legislation, it is only logical, as ‘advisors’ 
who cannot consider the majority of the market, cannot possibly provide advice as they 
do not consider all the options. On the other hand, for advice to qualify as independent, 
                                                          
139 Article 22 (1), MCD. 
140 Article 22 (2), MCD. 
141 Article 22 (3), MCD. 
142 Recital 64, MCD. 
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sufficient share of credit agreements must be considered and the credit intermediary 
must not be remunerated for advisory services by one or more creditors, unless they 
represent majority of the market. These rules do not hinder Member States in adopting 
stricter rules.143 
 
To conclude, it needs to be stated that advisory services shall be provided only by 
creditors, credit intermediaries or appointed representatives.144 In the above text, when 
it was referred about credit intermediaries, creditors and appointed representatives 
were meant too. MCD also contains provision about ‘last moment warning’ – when 
entering into a credit agreement may put the consumer in risk, the credit intermediary 
shall warn the consumer. However, including this provision is upon Member State’s 
discretion.145 
 
In the author’s opinion provisions of MCD concerning advisory services, only reflect 
common sense and ‘normal’ state of things – advice needs to be personalised, 
otherwise it would be a common guideline, it must consider as many options as 
possible, otherwise it may be incorrect advice because of shortcomings in the spectrum 
of offers. Independent advice cannot be independent, if the advisor’s remuneration 
depends on the creditor. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
In the beginning, we said there were several key areas for consumer protection 
according to World Bank – consumer protection institutions, disclosure and sales 
practices, customer account handling and maintenance, privacy and data protection, 
dispute resolution mechanisms, guarantee and compensation schemes, financial 
literacy and consumer empowerment.  
 
The two pieces of legislation we focused on in this part, CCD and MCD, cover mainly 
disclosure and sales practices, customer account management and dispute resolution. 
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The core of the directives lies in pre-contractual information, contractual information 
and rights arising from credit agreements, big impact is seen also in credit 
intermediaries and their behaviour, so they are extensively regulated. Dispute 
resolution is outlined in few provisions as left for Member States to deal with the 
requirements. Regarding the other key areas, European law regulates some of them in 
different pieces of legislation – privacy and data protection, compensation schemes 
and prudential regulation. However, the directives focus mainly on regulating the 
service providers in all cases (creditors, credit intermediaries or even data processors), 
a lot of administrative requirements are imposed upon them which is on one hand 
necessary, on the other not so efficient as the protagonists remain consumers. More 
efforts shall be put into financial literacy and consumer empowerment as it could 





Previous parts described and analysed the chosen legislation of consumer protection 
in Insurance and Banking services. Now we shall determine the similarities and 
differences in both fields. 
 
Before we start the comparison, we shall stop to think about the concept of consumer 
in the terms of ‘who is regarded as typical or average consumer’. Average consumer 
shall be ‘reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant and circumspect’. A 
consumer who is not as described, is seen as vulnerable and atypical but who, in reality, 
is the average consumer. The law chooses not to protect vulnerable consumers, 
howsoever typical, because it might obstruct business flow146. Most of the measures 
count with capable consumers which is an alibistic approach but may be also 
necessary. The old principle of ‘vigilantibus iura’ leads us to the thought that you can 
provide protection and help to someone who can and wants to be helped to. 
 
3.1 General comparison  
If we look systematically at the topics discussed in previous parts, some of them can 
be compared in matters of insurance and banking, but some of them are linked strongly 
to banking or insurance business that they cannot be subject to comparison, e.g. APRC 
and early repayment. Some of the rules in one field can seem unrelated to the other 
field but if we regard them in bigger picture, connections and parallels can be found, 
such as creditworthiness assessment and determining target customers. 
 
Insurance distribution and consumer credit (including mortgage credit) differentiate in 
the risk which is regarded as the most significant one for the consumers – in insurance 
distribution, the legislation mostly regulates the insurance distributors, so those who 
sell the products and in consumer credit law the biggest risk is seen in the product 
itself. This difference arises from the use case of the products, because in insurance 
services the customers receive added value in mitigating risks or eliminating them 
while in credit services the customers receive immediate money without need to wait 
                                                          
146 Howells, ref. 90, p. 359. 
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to save them themselves and postpone the consumption. The results of the situation 
when the customers enter into detrimental agreements, differ in the fact, that for 
insurance products, the detriment can but does not have to occur because the insured 
incident may or may not happen, while for credits, the probability of detriment 
occurrence are significantly higher. 
 
3.2 Selected topics 
3.2.1 Contract clauses 
Direct interference in form of forbidding certain contract clauses and prescribing 
content of contracts is a rare approach in European law147 because it undermines the 
free will in contracting, if we can even speak of free will in today’s mass production 
of contracts, which are to be taken or left by consumers without any power to influence 
their content. Member States also prefer to preserve their national contract law without 
alterations from European legislation148. The different consequences, impact on the 
consumer and economy may be the reason why the legislator chose to incorporate 
provisions regulating the content of credit agreements but not insurance agreements. 
Also the fact, that IDD regulates not only consumer contract but generally insurance 
contracts in the insurance distribution framework, might have played a role. CCD and 
MCD guarantee the right of withdrawal and early repayment. The consumers might 
not be able to negotiate such important clauses without legal requirements. IDD 
contains no provisions comparable to these, although we may imagine that right of 
withdrawal and premature termination of the contract could be incorporated. The 
author does not regard them necessary in the case of insurance contract as need for 
insurance policy usually lasts for longer periods of time and is not subject to frequent 
changes. 
 
Risk sharing is another quite interesting concept in rigid contract clause. Its use has 
been found in linked credit agreements149 where the credit is dependent on the contract 
                                                          
147 We may find EU law which outlines prohibited clauses, such as Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 
April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, but generally legislators avoid direct interference. 
148 WEATHERILL, Stephen. EU Consumer Law and Policy: Elgar European Law Series. Edwar Elgar 
Publishing, 2013. P. 145. ISBN 0857936980.  
149 Article 15, CCD. 
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for supply of goods or services and the creditor is jointly liable for supply of goods. 
No such provision can be found in IDD even though insurance policies are often 
offered together with goods (e.g. warranty insurance or transportation insurance). Even 
though the author sees the joint liability in linked credit agreements as problematic, 
she believes it would be fair to include such a provision in insurance law too. Insurance 
policies are certainly less costly than credits for goods purchase and they are of less 
significance to the agreement conclusion but still some of them might be important 
part of the contract for goods purchase such as those of prolonged warranty for 
electronics. Withdrawal from such contract shall, according to the author, mean 
withdrawal from the insurance contract too as it is useless to have insurance for goods 
which is not in possession of the consumer. 
 
3.2.2 Information disclosure 
All three directives contain very detailed provisions on information disclosure – 
regarding what categories of information, when and how shall be disclosed. IDD 
focuses mainly on information linked to insurance distributors and less to insurance 
contracts, that is why the relevant information shall be disclosed prior to contract 
conclusion. MCD contains both pre-contractual and contractual information, majority 
of them related to the credit agreement and just some to credit intermediaries. CDD is 
limited to information related to the contract and omits information about credit 
intermediaries. The outlined differences among the directives reflect their main 
interests and aims. All of the directives introduce information forms150 which shall 
simplify comparing different products by well-arranged forms. 
 
Information forms can be helpful and support the importance of information but we 
must not forget that consumer’s ability to use them fully is limited by certain 
tendencies in human thinking and behaviour: limited ability to understand and process 
information, self-serving interpretations, over- (and under-) optimism, warnings with 
less impact (preferring current smaller profit to future higher cost), presentation and 
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marketing.151 In terms of credit (and sometimes insurance) products, another particular 
risk is imposing additional costs for consumer behaviour such as late payment  which 
do not have to stand out from the disclosed information in the same way like extremely 
high APRC152. The maximum number of pieces of information to absorb by average 
person is seven, but the amount of information according to all three directives is much 
bigger which can lead, despite the standardized information forms, to information 
overloading153. The author therefore suggests highlighting the most important 
information or creating special section in the information forms bringing the most 
important information. 
 
3.2.3 Professional requirements 
IDD and MCD contain very similar rules on freedom to provide services and freedom 
of establishment – the rights and obligations of the intermediaries, host and home 
Member States. Regarding the requirements of knowledge, skills, repute, indemnity 
insurance and others, MCD and IDD do not differ significantly. They however take 
different approach to some groups of intermediaries – MCD contains less strict rules 
for credit intermediaries tied to only one creditor and appointed representatives as they 
do not have to register and fulfil professional requirements because creditors or credit 
intermediaries are responsible for their actions and omissions. On the other hand, 
ancillary insurance intermediaries can operate in ‘milder’ regime thanks to the fact that 
insurance distribution is not their primary occupation. According to the author, it is 
quite interesting, that credit intermediaries tied to one creditor may be practically 
operating in very similar way to employees of insurance undertaking but are regulated 
differently. Certainly, insurance intermediaries might be interested in appointing 
representatives but IDD does not foresee that. Vice versa, ancillary credit 
intermediaries could exist too but not regulated, respectively regulated as regular 
intermediaries. CCD contain no professional requirements for credit intermediaries, it 
only outlines information to be disclosed to consumers in connection to them. That is 
quite remarkable because intermediaries’ regulation became essential part of consumer 
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152 Ibid., p.362. 
153 Ibid., p. 363. 
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protection and also unified registration in the EU contributes to execution of freedom 
of establishment and freedom to provide services. Credit intermediaries intermediate 
consumer credit in 29% of cases154 which does not leave space for speculation of 
redundance of such regulation. 
 
3.2.4 Advisory services 
CCD does not regulate advisory services at all, IDD to some extent and MCD contains 
most detailed and strictest rules. IDD and MCD both requires that customers are 
informed whether they are being given advice or not and the advice shall be based on 
personal recommendation and the intermediaries shall consider sufficient number of 
products. IDD provides less strict regime for insurance product without investment 
elements while stricter regime is applied for IBIPs and is similar to the one under 
MCD. On the other hand, MCD provides big discretion area for Member States to 
introduce further restrictions. It is quite interesting that MCD contains elaborated rules 
while IDD does not, even though the core of the directive lies in the intermediation. 
For ordinary insurance, it may be understandable but for IBIPs it is not as such 
products are also very important for consumers. 
 
3.2.5 Remuneration 
Insurance Distribution Directive contains more detailed and stricter remuneration rules 
than MCD (CCD does not regulate remuneration at all). The reason is, according to 
the author, that recommending unsuitable insurance policies is easier and therefore 
more likely to happen than recommending unsuitable credits. The most important 
features of a credit agreement are the amount of credit, annual percentage rate of 
charge (total cost of credit) and default penalties, which can be compared easier than 
different insurance policies, where the customer needs to consider at least the insured 
risk, limits, premiums and exemptions from the policy. Recommending unsuitable 
policy for which the insurance distributor receive higher commission is therefore more 
likely to happen in insurance contracts and that is why it is more important for 
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insurance law to introduce fair rules for remuneration155 and its disclosure156. MCD 
regulates remuneration of credit intermediaries both for consumer protection157 and in 
the sense of risk management and economy welfare158, meaning the creditors shall not 
undergo inadequate risk, consumer protection does not play the main role. The author 
thinks that CCD (and partly MCD) should emphasize more consumer protection by 
introducing rules on remuneration disclosure and remuneration calculation because it 
may help the consumers in decision making and would not impose oppressive burden 
upon the credit intermediaries. 
 
3.2.6 Conflict of interest 
CCD does not contain any provision on conflict of interest while MCD regulates it 
directly only by providing that remuneration policies shall be drafted in such way that 
they avoid conflict of interest159. Otherwise it expects conflict of interest to be solved 
by disclosing certain information according to Recitals 22, 31, 47. IDD anticipates 
more elaborated measures to avoid it in connection with IBIPs. Generally, it is natural 
that especially insurance undertakings may encounter situations when they shall 
represent both parties (or are one of the party) but such a situation may happen also in 
connection with mortgage credit (e.g. two neighbouring properties whose owners seek 
mortgage credit with the same creditor). Consumers may apply for credit with different 
creditor therefore they may avoid detriment while customers of certain undertaking 
may be more threatened by conflict of interest arising when the insurance policy shall 
be executed. Therefore, the author understands different approaches for each of the 
directives. 
 
3.2.7 Cross-selling, tying and bundling practices 
CCD does not regulate tying and bundling practices. MCD allow bundling (products 
can be purchased together or separately) but forbid tying (products can be purchased 
only in package) unless tying is beneficial to the customer or the tied product is 
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157 Article 7 (4), MCD. 
158 Article 7 (3), MCD. 
159 Recital 31, Article 7 (3) (b), MCD. 
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insurance policy. MCD anticipates even certain scenarios for bundling practices. IDD 
takes very different approach as it emphasizes information disclosure to the customer 
– possibility of purchasing the products separately, differences when purchased 
together and separately. Tying is forbidden for non-insurance products except of 
investment. The author finds the provision of IDD better as it emphasizes information 
of customer and explaining the differences between packages and separate products 
while defining the boundaries of cross-selling. MCD lacks information disclosure, 
which the author finds important – the customer should be aware of possibilities and 
their costs. The anticipated scenarios for bundling practices might be too casuistic.  
 
3.2.8 Dispute resolution 
All three directives provide that out-of-court dispute resolution shall be established. 
Some Member States established or will establish single institution to provide out-of-
court redress. 
 
3.2.9 Assessment of suitability of the product for the customer 
MCD and IDD both anticipate that suitability of certain product shall be assessed when 
providing advisory services. Beside that, IDD provides that the product oversight and 
governance process shall contain also defining target market. MCD prescribes 
creditworthiness assessment. The two processes are very different but both of them 
carry features of suitability assessment. POG abstractly defines the future customers 
while creditworthiness assessment examines whether certain customer is eligible for 
mortgage credit with specific features. Both processes can contribute to overall 
consumer protection by eliminating consumers’ wrong choices and represent 
boundaries even though creditworthiness assessment serve primarily as protection 
from irresponsible lending from the side of creditors. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
In the above outlined areas, we saw that MCD and IDD regulate similar topics in 
similar ways using similar tools to ensure consumer protection. Their approaches 
usually differ slightly which can be due to the products in question and current 
interests, trends and aims of legislators. CCD contains only some of the rules and not 
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so in detail as the other directives. MCD is the most complex legislation and it is due 
to the role of mortgage credit in the economy, society and life of consumers. IDD is 
less strict and detailed but covers more areas than CCD, probably because it is 8 years 
younger than CCD and regulates also IBIPs which generally require more attention 
than simple everyday consumer credits. We need to emphasize the facts, that CCD 
omits regulating credit intermediaries and that IDD protects not only consumers but 





In this thesis, we examined the three main pieces of legislation in the EU regulating 
pre-contractual and contractual protection of consumers. We identified the key areas 
of protection and the means to achieve it. The main means and measures are very 
similar in insurance and banking law in general but contain minor differences. 
Information disclosure plays the main role in consumer protection, but it is limited by 
consumer and his or her knowledge and willingness to engage with it. The legislators 
rarely forbid certain provisions from contracts because it would interfere with free 
contracting will, nevertheless such measures are very effective. Rules of conduct and 
internal policies are only supportive measures and can play a more important role in 
internal controls rather than in the relationship with consumer. Out-of-court redress 
was introduced in both insurance and banking law and consumers make use of it, 
however it plays a supportive role only because exercise of rights can be achieved with 
standard methods of dispute resolution as well. Financial literacy of consumers appears 
in the legislation as a mere declaration because it does not belong to the objectives of 
this kind of legislation to ensure consumer’s education, because systematic measures 
and processes to support it throughout the EU are needed. 
 
All the consumer protection measures are limited by the consumers – their knowledge, 
experience and willingness to exercise their rights. Another boundary in consumer 
protection is the fact that legal regulation shall not hinder effective working of 
economy, circumvent progress and impose unnecessary administrative burden. In the 
end excessive consumer protection could decrease consumers’ welfare because they 
benefit from innovation and progress in financial services which can be limited by the 
excessive protection. 
 
Financial services law is largely influenced by the state of economy and trends in the 
times of legislation adoption – the more recent the more detailed and consumer 
empowering. Another determining element is the effect of the sector on the economy 
– mortgage credits can significantly affect it, therefore it is the most regulated area. In 
other words, consumer credit law is highly influenced by the fact that over-
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indebtedness harms not only the consumers themselves but also the economy and 
social welfare (together with politics).  
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Srovnávací analýza ochrany klienta bankovních a 
pojišťovacích služeb v EU 
 
Abstrakt  
Cílem práce je srovnat prostředky ochrany spotřebitele a její úroveň napříč Evropskou 
unií při poskytovaní pojistných a bankovních služeb. Výchozí tezí práce je předpoklad, 
že prostředky ochrany jsou v obou sektorech velmi podobné, neboť patří mezi finanční 
služby, které jsou regulovány podobným způsobem. První část práce se věnuje analýze 
Směrnice o distribuci pojištění, zkoumá její přínos pro ochranu spotřebitele a také ji z 
tohoto hlediska porovnává se Směrnicí o zprostředkování pojištění, která je platnou a 
účinnou v době uzavření manuskriptu práce. Druhá část práce se zabývá analýzou a 
srovnáním evropského práva týkajícího se spotřebitelských úvěrů, konkrétně Směrnice 
o smlouvách o spotřebitelském úvěru a Směrnice o smlouvách o spotřebitelském úvěru 
na nemovitosti určené k bydlení. Obě směrnice jsou porovnány z hlediska 
aplikovaných prostředků ochrany spotřebitele a toho, jak ochranu spotřebitele zajišťují 
celkově. Třetí část práce se věnuje srovnání právní úpravy, která byla zkoumána v 
předchozích dvou částech, dále také zdůvodňuje rozdíly v přístupech k ochraně 
spotřebitele zvolených v jednotlivých směrnicích a jejich zaměření na jednotlivé 
oblasti. Výsledkem provedené analýzy je to, že prostředky ochrany spotřebitele jsou v 
bankovnictví a pojišťovnictví velmi podobné, vyskytují se ovšem i zásadní rozdíly 
plynoucí z podstaty poskytovaných služeb. Nejpropracovanější směrnicí, která 
zajišťuje nejvyšší úroveň ochrany spotřebitele je Směrnice o spotřebitelském úvěru na 
nemovitosti určené k bydlení, a to patrně z toho důvodu, že úvěr na nemovitosti určené 
k bydlení hraje velmi důležitou roli v životě spotřebitele, ale i v ekonomice. Směrnice 
o distribuci pojištění nabízí vyšší stupeň ochrany spotřebitele než Směrnice o 
smlouvách o spotřebitelském úvěru. Důvodem je pravděpodobně to, že Směrnice o 
distribuci pojištění byla přijata o 8 let později a upravuje nejen pojišťovací smlouvy, 
ale i distributory pojištění, zatímco Směrnice o smlouvách o spotřebitelském úvěru 
zprostředkovatele úvěru neupravuje. K rozdílné úrovni ochrany spotřebitele přispívá 
také fakt, že hlavní cíle všech tří směrnic jsou rozdílné – Směrnice o smlouvách o 
spotřebitelském úvěru se zaměřuje téměř výhradně na úvěrové smlouvy, Směrnice o 
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smlouvách o spotřebitelském úvěru na nemovitosti určené k bydlení upravuje nejen 
úvěrové smlouvy, ale i zprostředkovatele úvěru, zatímco Směrnice o distribuci 





Comparative analysis of client´s protection in banking and 
insurance services within the EU 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this thesis is to compare measures of consumer protection and its level 
in insurance and banking services in the EU. The premise is that the measures are very 
similar because both areas are subject to financial services law and as such they are 
similarly regulated. The first part of this work analyses and examines Insurance 
Distribution Directive and its contribution to consumer protection. The thesis 
compares Insurance Distribution Directive with Insurance Mediation Directive which 
is the legislation in force as of the time of writing this thesis. The second part of the 
thesis analyses, examines and compares Consumer Credit Directive and Mortgage 
Credit Directive and their contribution to consumer protection. The third part of the 
thesis compares the two previous parts and describes the reasons for different 
approaches taken in the researched legislation. The result of the analysis is that the 
measures taken for consumer protection are indeed very similar with differences 
originating from the nature of the services. The most elaborated directive which 
ensures the highest level of consumer protection is Mortgage Credit Directive and it is 
due to the significance of mortgage credit for lives of consumers and for the economy. 
Insurance Distribution Directive offers higher level of consumer protection than 
Consumer Credit Directive which is probably due to the fact that it was adopted more 
recently and that it regulates to large extent not only insurance contracts, but also 
insurance distributors. Consumer Credit Directive omits regulation of credit 
intermediaries. Another factor causing different level of consumer protection is that 
the main objectives of the regulation are different – for Consumer Credit Directives, 
the main objective is contract for credit, for Mortgage Credit Directive, the main 
objective is contract for mortgage credit but also credit intermediaries while Insurance 
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